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NOTES
TYING THE BRAID OF SECOND-PARENT
ADOPTIONS-WHERE DUE PROCESS MEETS
EQUAL PROTECTION
ChristopherColorado*
INTRODUCTION

Victoria and Laura, same-sex partners, both held legal, parental custody
of each other's biological children, Maya and Tessa. 1 The parental
relationships of Victoria and Laura had been made legitimate by a U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia. 2 When Victoria died in an
automobile accident, Laura was automatically designated as the parent of
Victoria's biological child Maya without court involvement.3 But consider
an alternate ending where, subsequent to Victoria's death, Maya is not left
with Laura and Tessa, but is removed from the home and designated as a
ward of the state. 4 Or, additionally, consider a hypothetical where Victoria
leaves Laura after a long-term relationship and a mutual involvement with
the children, only to take her child with her and not allow Laura any
visitation rights. The striking contrast between these resolutions provides
an illustration of the role of adoptions within same-sex relationships, and
5
specifically within second-parent adoptions.
The availability of these second-parent adoptions is not uniform
throughout the United States, and approval of this mode of adoption is
largely within the jurisdiction of the state legislature or court system.6
Family law is only decided on the federal level when state restrictions are in
contravention of the Constitution. 7 This Note addresses the proper seat of
second-parent adoption at the constitutional table. Given the deference to
* J.D. Candidate 2006, Fordham Law School. I would like to thank Professor Tracy Higgins
for her insight and guidance in the development of this Note.
1. See Nclrights.org, Adoption By Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Parents: An Overview
of Current Law 9, http://nclrights.org/publications/pubs/adptn0204.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,
2005) [hereinafter Overview].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See id. at 10.
5. For a definition of second-parent adoption, see infra text accompanying notes 56-57.
6. See infra Parts I.A-B.
7. See Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1787, 1880-81

(1995).
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the states in the family law arena, there may be no room for second-parent
adoptions. Generally, federal courts have left regulation of traditional
adoptions to state courts and state law. 8 However, it remains to be seen
whether the second-parent adoption mechanism is more appropriately
categorized with the constitutionally unprotected traditional adoptions or
with those types of family relationships which have received constitutional
protection, and are outside the sphere of state regulation.
To investigate the constitutional implications of second-parent adoptions,
this Note will braid three different issues. This Note will explore how the
U.S. Supreme Court has dealt with state restrictions on family units. 9 This
Note will also explore constitutional challenges which have involved both
equal protection and due process considerations simultaneously. 10 Finally,
this Note will look at the conflicting treatment, and approval or disapproval,
of the type of adoption known as second-parent adoption. "1
Part I addresses the statutory and constitutional foundations needed for
an understanding of a claim of heightened constitutional protection for
second-parent adoptions. Part II details certain, sometimes conflicting,
approaches to areas of constitutional family law.
Part III makes the case that the liberty interest in second-parent adoption
is more similar to that of the traditional, and constitutionally protected,
family. As a further constitutional consideration, this Note will consider the
right implicated in second-parent adoption cases-an equal protection
consideration for the homosexual class-asserting that the intertwining of
this equal protection interest with the important quasi-family interest
buttresses a claim to constitutional respect for second-parent adoptions.
I. ADOPTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Part L.A provides a background of second-parent adoptions, juxtaposed
with a brief description of the history of traditional adoption. This part also
describes the development of the "best interest of the child" standard, by
which courts and state agencies determine if a particular adoption should be
allowed. Part I.B demonstrates contexts where the Supreme Court has
invalidated restrictions related to state family law, exploring particular
constitutional liberties related to the family. Part I.C introduces a second
constitutional consideration, found in those cases where the Court has relied
on or recognized the power of the co-presence of multiple constitutional
interests, specifically those related to due process and equal protection.

8. Id. at 1789 (noting the U.S. Supreme Court's fusion "around the principle that family
law constitutes a clearly defined realm of exclusive state regulatory authority"); cf, e.g.,
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (rejecting reasoning which would allow
Congress to regulate "family law (including marriage, divorce and child custody)").

9. See infra Parts I.B.1-2, II.B.
10. See infra Part I.C.
11. See infra Part II.A.
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A. Adoptions
Adoptions occurred in ancient periods as well as in colonial America.
This section will touch on the development of adoption in the United States
from the 1800s through 1930s, as well as an explanation of contemporary
legal treatment of adoption by the states. This section will also detail the
handling of an adoption-related claim on the Supreme Court level in Smith
12
v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER).
Finally, the section will explore the "second-parent" adoption variant in
which the parent's same-sex partner adopts the child.
1. Past to Present
Adoption originally began in order to preserve lineage by providing
families with male heirs, and has been performed for thousands of years
since the Egyptian, Babylonian, and Roman civilizations. 13 In America,
adoptions remain the province of state statutes, and are generally subject
only to state regulation. 14 The first American adoption frameworks were
constructed in 1846 by Mississippi and 1851 by Massachusetts. 15 The
focus of early American adoptions tended to be the potential economic
utility of the adopted children rather than "the emotional and sentimental
16
enrichment" created by the addition of an adopted child to a family.
However, by the 1930s the general temper towards adoption had shifted,

12. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
13. Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 743,
743-44 (1956). In his article, The Law of Adoption, Leo Huard notes adoption references in
the Hindu Laws of Manu, the writings of Cicero, the biblical account of Moses, as well as
the Code of Hammurabi, which states, "If a man take a child in his name, adopt and rear him
as a son, this grown up son may not be demanded back." Id. at 744. Adoptions can be
categorized into four distinct procedural forms: (i) adoption through public or private
agency, (ii) adoption through the mother, (iii) adoption through an international agency, or
(iv) a second-parent adoption. Hayden Curry et al., A Legal Guide for Lesbian and Gay
Couples 3/21 (10th ed. 1999).
14. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption Law and Practice § 1.01[1], at 1-4 (2004) ("For the
most part, adoption is the product of and subject to state laws and regulations, not federal
ones . .

.

. Nonetheless, there is a growing body of federal statutory and constitutional law

pertaining to adoptions."); see also infra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
15. See Huard, supra note 13, at 748 (citing Catherine N. McFarlane, The Mississippi
Law on Adoptions, 10 Miss. L.J. 239, 240 (1938)); see also Walter Wadlington & Raymond
C. O'Brien, Family Law in Perspective 198 (2001). It has been noted that "unlike most
American laws" adoption "did not derive from English common law." Lisa A. Fuller, Note,
Intestate Succession Rights of Adopted Children: Should the Stepparent Exception Be
Extended?, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1188, 1191 (1992). In fact, "[a]doption in the Roman sense
of the term was not legally possible in England until the Adoption of Children Act of 1926."
Huard, supra note 13, at 746.
16. See Hollinger, supra note 14, § 1.03[7], at 1-44. The lack of concern for the adoptee
follows the character of early Roman adoptions where "the primary purpose of adoption
[was] the continuity of the adopter's family-there [was] . .. no visible concern for the 'best
interests' of the adoptee." Huard, supra note 13, at 745.

1428

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

and social workers began to frame adoption in terms of the benefits and
17
positive emotional effect on the adopted children.
This shift in concern from the family's benefit to the benefit to the child
is manifested by the current standard governing approval of adoptions: "the
best interest of the child" standard. 18 This standard is used by the majority
of states when determining whether to create a relationship between the
potential parent and the adoptee child. 19 The state court system, as well as
administrative and adoption agencies, evaluates a potential adoption by
determining what action is in the "best interest of the child"-this
determination often includes an analysis by social workers joined with
medical and social profiles of the potential adopters. 20 This evaluation
becomes an examination of the potential "personal and psychological
dynamics of the relationship between the child and the adopting parents."'2 1
Ultimately, a successful placement of the child should result in the parental
fitness of the adopter and a seamiess assimilation of the child into a newly
22
created family unit.
In addition to the "best interest of the child" standard, contemporary
traditional 23 state adoptions are characterized by elements such as "parental
consent" to the adoption and the "permanence of the adoptive
17. See Hollinger, supra note 14, § 1.04, at 1-46 ("[C]hild welfare professionals...
were touting the benefits of placing dependent children in substitute homes that could
replicate the 'natural family."'). The emphasis on providing the child with a positive
situation is evident in a 1935 study and treatise on American family law, which notes that the
"most important development in the law of adoption" was the administrative assessment of
the "suitability of the child for adoption, and the capability and suitability of those desiring
to adopt, to care for, and to rear the child." 4 Chester G. Vernier, American Family Laws
255, 279-80 (1936).
18. Joan Hollinger states that, in the past, adoption proceedings were more "'ministerial'
than 'judicial,"' noting that administrative agencies neither looked into the background,
income, or compatibility of the adopter nor sought to understand the desires and needs of the
children. Hollinger, supra note 14, § 1.03[2], at 1-30.
19. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 114 (McKinney 1999); see also Suzanne Bryant,
Second-parent Adoption: A Model Brief, 2 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 233, 234 (1995);
Huard, supra note 13, at 750 ("[O]ur adoption laws are all based on the 'best interests'
formula.").
20. Hollinger, supra note 14, § 1.01[2][b], at 1-12; see N.J. Admin. Code § 10:121A5.5a (2000) (requiring a pre-adoptive study of the child including (i) medical examination,
(ii) child's family history related to hereditary factors and pathological abnormalities, (iii)
child's placement history, and (iv) evaluation of a handicapped child's strength and
limitations); 10A N.C. Admin. Code 70H.0108(b) (1997) (evaluating the potential adopter
by considering, inter alia, (i) the applicant's motive, (ii) attitudes of the family, (iii) ability to
provide, (iv) physical examination of the adopter(s), and (v) personal character references).
21. Hollinger, supra note 14, § 1.01[2][b], at 1-12.
22. See id., § 3.01[1]; D. Marianne Brower Blair, Getting the Whole Truth and Nothing
but the Truth: The Limits of Liability for Wrongful Adoption, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev 851,
945 n.502 (1992) (citing Child Welfare League of America, Standards for Adoption Service,
which stated that the main function of adoption should be to help children "benefit from
family life, to become members of a family that can give them the love, care, protection, and
opportunities essential for their healthy personal growth and development").
23. The term "traditional adoption" will be used here and throughout to represent the
paradigm of the nuclear couple, mother and father, receiving a child into their home to create
the nuclear family.
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relationship." 24 Vital to the preservation of these characteristics, and the
state framework for the contemporary adoption, is a reliance on both (i) the
state judiciary as a gatekeeper of adoption approval, and (ii) the use of state
25
contract principles to facilitate and preserve the institution of adoption.
conventional adoption creates a
Through these state law mechanisms
26
relationship between child and adult.
A quasi-contractual 27 element of adoption is evidenced by the implied
promise of the adoptive parents to (i) "support the child" and (ii) "relieve
the biological parent of his or her legal duty to support the child" in
exchange for the transfer of the child and the parental rights. 28 In this
exchange, the new parent accepts accountability for decisions regarding the
"child's health, education and well-being," and pledges to provide
Subsequent to the adoption, the adopter has
economic support. 29
over the adoptee, as if the adoptee were the
unequivocal parental rights
30
birth child of the adopter.
Following this exchange between the biological parent and the adopter,
as a general rule, all relations and rights which ran between the child and
the biological parents are severed. 3 1 Courts have enforced this severance
because the discontinuance of parental rights protects "the security of the
child's newly-created family unit by eliminating involvement with the
child's natural parents." 32 However, in contrast to the general rule, some
states do not sever the biological parent's rights and relations upon adoption
when the adopter is a stepparent. In these instances, the state allows the
24. See Hollinger, supra note 14, § 1.0112], at 1-8.
25. Id.; National Center for State Courts, Knowledge and Information Services:
Adoption, http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/FAQs/AdoptFAQ.htm#What%20role (last visited
").
Oct. 3, 2005) ("[The] courts are the conduits through which all adoption cases pass ....
For a discussion of the "counterhistory" of adoption law, making the case that "adoption
practice" has "deep private-ordering roots in contract law," see Amanda C. Pustilnik, Note,
Private Ordering, Legal Ordering, and the Getting of Children: A Counterhistory of
Adoption Law, 20 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 263, 264 (2002). See also In re Adoption of D, 252
P.2d 223, 228-29 (Utah 1953) (utilizing contract law concepts to settle an adoption dispute).
26. See Unif. Adoption Act § 1-102, 9 U.L.A. 16 (1999) available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/blI/ulc/fnact99/1990s/uaa94.pdf (stating that the purpose of
adoption is "creating the relationship of parent and child").
27. Hollinger points out that adoption can also be characterized as "analogous to
testamentary dispositions" in that the parent "'bestows' the child upon the adoptive parents."
See Hollinger, supra note 14, § 1.01[2](f), at 1-14, 1-15.
28. Id. at 1-15.
29. See Curry et al., supra note 13, at 3/3.
30. D. Kelly Weisberg & Susan Frelich Appleton, Modem Family Law 1192 (2d ed.
2002) ("This principle treats the adoptee as a legitimate blood descendant of the adopter for
all purposes.").
31. See Hollinger, supra note 14, § 12.03[1], at 12-10 to -28.
32. In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993). The divestment of
rights in the biological parents promotes the creation of a bona fide family unit between the
adopter and adoptee by removing any latent contest for decision making in the child's life
between the biological and adoptive guardians. See Carmel B. Sella, When a Mother Is a
Legal Strangerto Her Child: The Law's Challenge to the Lesbian Nonbiological Mother, 1
UCLA Women's L.J. 135, 151 (1991) (discussing the necessity of the severance where there
will be a struggle among guardians as to the best interest of the child).
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spouse of the biological parent to adopt the child without divesting the
biological parent of his or her parental rights. 33 In other words, this
exception to the severance rule adds on the stepparent without affecting the
original parent's rights. 34 Statutorily, the "stepparent exception" to the
severance rule is available only to a married couple, creating eligibility for
35
the exception only for spouses of the biological parent.
2. Contract Law and the Right to Adopt: Smith v. Organizationof Foster
Familiesfor Equality and Reform (OFFER)
A claim of the constitutional right to use the adoption mechanism was
presented to, and dismissed by, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER).36 In Smith, the
Court's ambivalence towards contractual relationships, as compared with a
respect for the natural family, led to a denial of a constitutional right to
adopt. 37 Smith is often cited as the Supreme Court's determination that a
constitutional right to adoption is unavailable because the adoption process
38
lacks a fundamental constitutional quality.
In Smith, foster parents brought an action alleging that procedures
governing the removal of foster children from foster homes in New York
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 39 Under
New York law, as in Smith, when a parent was unable or unwilling to
properly care for a child, the child was housed in an "institutional setting"
or placed in a foster home. 40 In this surrogate foster family home the
responsibility for the child was divided "among [the] agency, foster parents,
and natural parents." 4 1 Under this system any particular parental roles were
obscure, and the child's "loyalties, emotional involvements, and
responsibilities [were] often divided among three adult authority figures,"
resulting in anomalous legal and emotional relationships. 42 Ultimately the
agency had the power to terminate the child-foster parent relationship, and

33. Mark Strasser, Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent Adoptions: On Judicial
Deference, Specious Reasoning, and the Best Interests of the Child, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 1019,

1025 n.27 (1999) (citing, among others, Mont. Code Ann. § 42-4-311(2) (1997), for the
proposition that "[aln adoption by a stepparent does not affect... the relationship between
the adoptee and the adoptee's parent who is the adoptive stepparent's spouse or deceased
spouse").

34. Hollinger, supra note 14, § 3.06[6], at 3-61.
35. See Wadlington & O'Brien, supra note 15, at 206.
36. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
37. Id. at 819.
38. See, e.g., Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (citing
Smith, 431 U.S. at 816); Lindley for Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 131 (7th Cir. 1989)
(citing Smith, 431 U.S. at 816).
39. Smith, 431 U.S. at 818-20.
40. Id. at 826.
41. Id. The natural parents have both visitation rights, and "an absolute right to the
return of [the] child." Id. at 828, 846.
42. Id. at 826 n.16.
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could transfer a foster child from her 43foster home pursuant to the
satisfaction of a ten-day notice requirement.
In Smith, foster parents contended that a constitutional "liberty interest"
existed in the preservation of the foster family, arguing that the use of the
adoption mechanism should be protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 44 Initially, the Smith Court noted that the state's
ability to define the family should be limited by constitutional
considerations, but questioned whether the relation of foster parent to foster
of constitutional protections set
child was within the projected "continuum"
45
forth in preceding family law cases.
The Smith Court acknowledged that a biological tie was not a
prerequisite to constitutional protection for a family unit, drawing in part on
Justice Stewart's dissent in Moore v. City of East Cleveland46 which had
also alluded to the insufficiency of biology as the sole determinant of
whether or not a particular family,4 7 or family-like unit, should receive
substantive constitutional protection.
However, the Court found that the characteristics of the foster family
were too attenuated from those of the natural family to receive
constitutional protection. 4 8 The primary distinction lay in the fact that the
state's adoption policy only restricted a "family" relationship (the foster
49
family) that was birthed from state contract law "from the outset."
Flowing from that state-created relationship, defenders of the state policy
had argued, was the transitory nature of the child's placement in the
home. 50 This transitory nature translated into a limited expectation of the
continuity of the foster parent-child relationship. 5 1 With state contract law
43. Id. at 829; see also N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 383(2), 400 (McKinney 2005). If the
foster parents oppose the transfer they may file for a conference with the Social Services
Department, from which a decision must be issued within five days. Smith, 431 U.S. at 82930. If the child is removed, the foster parents may appeal for a full hearing. Id. at 830.
"[T]he removal [of the child from the foster home] is not automatically stayed pending the
hearing ..." Id.
44. Smith, 431 U.S. at 839. The foster parents premised their objection on the
classification of this family interest as protected, and they reasoned that flowing from the
protected status was the constitutional necessity for increased administrative insulation from
the cessation of their foster family. Id. Any challenge to procedural due process preceding
the deprivation of a right necessarily involves the fundamental nature of the underlying right
because the Court must look "to the nature of the interest at stake" in order to determine the
sufficiency of the procedure. Id. at 841.
45. Id. at 842; see infra note 112 and accompanying text. This continuum is discussed
infra in Parts I.B and II.B.
46. 431 U.S. 494, 531 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
47. Smith, 431 U.S. at 843 n.50. In an additional rejection of the primacy of biology, the
Smith Court noted that " t]he basic foundation of the family in our society, the marriage
relationship, is [itself] not a matter of' biology but rather found in "the emotional
attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association." Id. at 843-44.
48. Id. at 845.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 824-25. This temporary arrangement was "unlike adoptive placement, which
implies a permanent substitution of one home for another." Id. at 824.
51. ld. at 824, 860.

1432

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

at the heart of a foster family with temporary expectations, the structure in
question was attenuated from family structures receiving constitutional
52
protection in Supreme Court precedent.
Second, the Court observed the competing liberties attendant under the
foster parent/adoption construct created by New York law. 5 3 The
establishment of the foster parent's right to adopt the child would
"derogat[e] ...the substantive liberty of another," namely, any remaining
rights of the natural parent. 54 The prospective destruction of the natural
parent's rights minimized whatever substantive interest existed in the right
'55
to adopt and also the "foster family as an institution.
Thus, the Smith Court effectively withheld recognition of a foster
parent's constitutional right to adopt. However, Part I.A.3 introduces a
variety of adoption, second-parent adoption, which lies outside the foster
family context of Smith but which rests upon the similar constitutional
framework of family rights.
3. Second-Parent Adoptions
Distinct from traditional adoption is the second-parent adoption. 56 A
second-parent adoption pertains to a relationship model initiated in the
1980s by the National Center for Lesbian Rights for the purpose of
"protecting children in same-sex parent families. '57 A second-parent
adoption is a "procedure that allows a same-sex co-parent to adopt his or
her partner's biological or adopted child. '58 Once the second-parent

52. Id. at 845; see infra Parts I.B, ll.B.
53. Smith, 431 U.S. at 846. This concern is also manifested in the severance provision
of the current majority state law adoption doctrine. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying
text.
54. Smith, 431 U.S. at 846. The Court stated as follows:
It is one thing to say that individuals may acquire a liberty interest against arbitrary
governmental interference in the family-like associations into which they have
freely entered, even in the absence of biological connection or state-law
recognition of the relationship. It is quite another to say that one may acquire such
an interest ...that derives from blood relationship, state-law sanction, and basic
human right-an interest the foster parent has recognized by contract from the
outset.
Id.
55. Id. at 846-47. The Court acknowledged the difficulty in parsing the scope of any
liberty interest in the foster family's right to adopt the children. Id. at 847. The Court
ultimately refrained from a definite ruling on the due process claim, choosing instead to
support its holding on the issue of procedural due process. Id.
56. See Curry et al., supra note 13, at 3/2 1. But see Jared C. Leuck, The Best Interests of
the Child in Adoption: An Article Review, 11 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 607, 609 (2000)
(stating that "[a]doption can take place in either of two ways: through the auspices of a
public or private adoption agency... [or] through independent adoption, in which the
adoption is arranged directly between the biological and adoptive parents").
57. National Center for Lesbian Rights, Second-parent Adoptions: A Snapshot of
Current Law 1, http://nclrights.org/publications/pubs/2pa0803.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,
2005).
58. See Hollinger, supra note 14, § 3.06[6], at 3-57.
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adoption is completed, the birth parent and the adopter parent have
59
equivalent rights vis-a-vis the child.
Unlike traditional adoption, which has the purpose of "creating a
relationship," 60 second-parent adoption legitimizes, in the eyes of the law, a
relationship which existed prior to any state involvement. The most
common manifestation of the request for state approval of a second-parent
adoption occurs where the child is born to a same-sex couple through the
use of reproductive technologies, including artificial insemination, and
where the nonbiological parent seeks legal ratification of his or her parental
61
status.
Within this paradigm of the artificially inseminated "triad" (the
biological parent, nonbiological partner, and the child), the consistent
parental influence provided by a nonlegal "second-parent" in his or her
relationship with the partner's biological child parallels the consistency
commonly thought to pervade conventional biological relationships.
Despite a single biological relationship, the two-parent unit (the biological
plus the nonbiological partner) participates in rearing and supporting the
child from birth. 62 The similarities of childhoods under either parental
construct expand any "traditional notions about reproduction, child-bearing,
child-rearing, and those who participate in this process." 6 3 Unlike the
traditional adoption framework which creates a new family, 64 the
relationships fostered within this triad are developed regardless of state
involvement.
59. Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique of Second-Parent Adoptions, 14
Berkeley Women's L.J. 17, 26 (1999).
60. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
61. See In re Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Vt. 1993) ("It is
not the courts that have engendered the diverse composition of today's families. It is the
advancement of reproductive technologies and society's recognition of alternative lifestyles
that have produced families in which a biological, and therefore a legal, connection is no
longer the sole organizing principle."); see also Jane S. Schacter, Constructing Families in a
Democracy: Courts, Legislatures and Second-Parent Adoption, 75 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 933,
934 (2000). While the use of reproductive facilities may be more common within the lesbian
female framework, it can be seen, hypothetically, in the case of a homosexual father who
employs a female surrogate. Second-parent adoptions also evolve where the legal parent has
sole custody of a child from a dissolved heterosexual relationship, and looks to form a legal
family comprised of his/her child and his/her same-sex partner. Mark Strasser, Adoption,
Best Interests, and the Constitution: On Rational Basis Scrutiny and the Avoidance of
Absurd Results, 5 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 297, 308 (2003).
62. See, e.g., In re Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d. at 1272. One student
commentator summarized the facts that led to the court allowing a second-parent adoption:
Jane and Deborah had lived together in a committed relationship since 1986.
Together they decided to have and rear children. On two separate occasions, Jane
gave birth to a son after being impregnated with sperm from an anonymous donor.
Deborah assisted the midwife at both births, and had been equally responsible for
parenting the children since their births.
Elizabeth Rover Bailey, Note, Three Men and a Baby: Second-ParentAdoptions and Their
Implications,38 B.C. L. Rev. 569, 572 (1997).
63. Alison Harvison Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigmof the
Exclusive Family, 6 Am. U. J. Gender & L. 505, 514 (1998).
64. See supra notes 18-30 and accompanying text.
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While the everyday, functional value of the triad exists without the
state's involvement, the state's legitimization of second-parent adoption
adds legal stability to the relationship. 65 The adoption allows the parent
partners to guarantee preservation of the family unit should the biological
parent predecease the nonbiological parent. 66 Further, second-parent
adoption also provides support in less remarkable circumstances, by
allowing the partner to "consent to medical care, meet with school officials,
or represent [the] child's interests to ...government agencies." 67 Some
state courts have attached weight to this stability when approving secondparent adoptions. For instance, in the case of In re Adoption of Tammy the
court found the child's best interest to be rooted in the second-parent
framework because the child could inherit under intestacy laws, be eligible
for coverage under the social security benefits of two parents, and have two
68
guardians obligated to provide economic support.
While second-parent adoptions have been approved in some instances,
the approval is not uniform. Part II.A explores legislative and judicial
resistance to second-parent adoption. Resistance to recognition of certain
family units, such as those created by second-parent adoptions, may raise
constitutional issues. Part I.B and I.C explore the Supreme Court's
treatment of two types of cases necessary to an evaluation of the
constitutional weight accorded to second-parent adoptions: (i) cases related
to family law, and (ii) cases which implicate both due process and equal
protection interests at the same time. Part II.B explores an argument that
the category of family units the Constitution has been held to protect is
constantly expanding.
B. Additional ConstitutionalImplicationsfor Second-ParentAdoption
State adoption law may not be the only legal structure applicable to the
regulation of adoptions. When same-sex parents propose to legalize a
family unit this attempt may implicate constitutional considerations related
to the right to craft or maintain a family. Part I.B.1 examines the
constitutional jurisprudence related to the right to raise a family. Part I.B.2
addresses the constitutional jurisprudence concerning the definition of the
family unit.
Family law, which includes both standard and second-parent forms of
adoption, is generally within the province of state regulation, and limits on
overregulation by the state are provided by the Constitution. 69 Because
65.
66.
67.
68.

See infra notes 300-21.
See In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Mass. 1993).
See Shapiro, supra note 59, at 22-23.
See Bailey, supra note 62, at 586 (citing In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at

320).
69. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of So. Pa. v. Casev, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) ("It is
settled now ... that the Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a
person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood."); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 7 (1967); see also Hollinger, supra note 14, § 1.01[1], at 1-4.
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majoritarian rule necessarily means the failure, to some extent, of the
minority to achieve legislative validation of their cause, the "[f]ederal
courts are often called upon... to consider the constitutional due process
and equal protection aspects of adoption proceedings." 70 In the due process
arena, prospective adoptive parents have challenged restrictions as improper
burdens on the fight to define and establish a family. 7 1 Challenges under
the Equal Protection Clause refer to the unequal availability of adoption to
potential adopters who are homosexual, as compared with those who are
heterosexual. 72 While the Supreme Court has not specifically held which
constitutional protections, if any, attach to second-parent adoptions, it has
addressed general issues in the area of adoption, namely Smith, 73 and
alternatively, in the area of the traditional family.
1. Constitutionally Protected Rights: Raising a Family and Controlling the
Child
Supreme Court jurisprudence relating to the development of the
constitutionally protected family has involved the right to have a family and
raise a child. Meyer v. Nebraska74 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters75 are two
early cases concerning family relations and constitutional rights, namely the
right or power of parents to control portions of a child's life. In Meyer, the
Court invalidated a state statute which criminalized the teaching of foreign
languages to children in schools. 76 The Court viewed this statute as an
infringement upon the constitutional liberties of the parent, which included,
among other things, the right to "establish a home and bring up children"
and "the power of parents to control the education of their own. ' 77 In
Pierce, the power of parents within the family construct was further
solidified when the Court invalidated a state statute which required children
to attend public schools, rather than those which were parochial or

70. Hollinger, supra note 14, § 1.01[1], at 1-5; see also C. Quince Hopkins, The
Supreme Court's Family Law Doctrine Revisited: Insights from Social Science on Family
Structures and Kinship Change in the United States, 13 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 431, 445-

46 (2004) (stating that "family-related cases fall under several different Constitutional
provisions and doctrines," namely the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
71. See, e.g., Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377, 1384-85 (10th Cir. 1989)
(addressing a liberty interest held in relationship to achild where the parents were in the
"preadoptive" stage); cf Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (challenging an
adoption statute, in part, as an invalid restriction on a father's liberty interest to have a
relationship with his son).
72. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (challenging a state statute denying
a custody hearing on gender equal protection grounds); Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't
of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977) (challenging the denial of an
adoption application on racial equal protection grounds).
73. See supra notes 36-55 and accompanying text.
74. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
75. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
76. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400-01, 403.
77. Id. at 399, 401.
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private. 78 The Court stated that the child was not the "mere creature of the
state," and as such, the law interfered "with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
'79
control.
Following the early establishment of certain rights belonging to
biological, and presumably married, parents, the Court, in Stanley v.
80
Illinois, faced a claim to parental rights by a biological, but unwed, father.
Petitioner Peter Stanley, an unwed father, had lived with his children and
their mother intermittently for eighteen years. 8 1 When their mother died,
Illinois state law automatically designated Stanley's children as wards of
the state. 82 The state reasoned that unwed fathers were presumptively unfit
to raise their own children. 83 The Supreme Court heard Stanley's claim that
the state law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because neither married fathers nor unmarried mothers were
presumed to be unfit while he, as an unmarried father, was presumed to be
84
an unfit parent.
The Court recognized Stanley's claim, finding the state's presumption
"inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause" because "all Illinois
parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their
children are removed from their custody." 85 In addition, the Court noted
that despite the lack of the legitimizing marital relationship that existed in
86
Meyer and Pierce, filaments of familial fundamental rights were present:
"[We have] frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights
to conceive and raise one's children have been deemed 'essential,'[and t]he
integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment ....
Stanley held that rights to the child
could flourish in a nonmarital relationship, so long as this structure
provided bonds just as "warm, enduring, and important as those arising
'88
within a more formally organized family unit."
Despite the recognition of the power of parents, including the power of
parents outside of the marital construct, the Supreme Court has hedged per
"87

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Pierce,268 U.S. at 534-35.
Id. at 534-35.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 647.
See id.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 651 (stating that the law has not "refused to recognize those family

relationships unlegitimized by ...

marriage").

87. Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). The Court explicitly
recognized the presence of both interests, and found the holding on the equal protection
thread, the interest which was raised below in the state court, to be congruent with a previous
holding in Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971), where a due process claim was raised
below, and the court was barred from recognizing the equal protection claim. Id. at 276-77
n.9.

88. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652.
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se validation of the parental rights of the unmarried, as evidenced by the
cases of Quilloin v. Walcott8 9 and Caban v. Mohammed. 90 In Caban, the
Court examined a New York statute that allowed children to be adopted
without their biological father's consent, resulting in the severance of any
parental relationship between the natural father and the child. 9 1 Similarly in
Quilloin, a Georgia statute did not permit a father to veto the adoption of his
eleven-year-old son by a stepfather. 92 The challenge to the statute in Caban
was filed by an unmarried father who had lived with his children and their
mother for several years .93 Conversely, the unmarried father and challenger
in Quilloin, decided by the Court a year earlier, had a minimal relationship
with the child, had never lived
with his child, and had failed to petition for
94
legitimation for eleven years.
95
While both statutes in Quilloin and Caban, much as in Stanley,
implicated the parental status of an unmarried father, only the statute in
Caban was invalidated. Justice Lewis Powell, writing for the Caban Court,
held the statute constitutionally invalid as it was based on overbroad gender
generalizations which did not support a "fundamental difference between
maternal and paternal relations." 9 6 The Caban Court focused on the
substance of the family and distinguished the decision upholding the statute
in Quilloin, because in Quilloin the father had not developed a relationship
with his child, an important step in the development of constitutionally
protected fundamental parental rights. 97 Thus, after Caban and Quilloin,
while an unmarried, biological father does not have automatic98 parental
rights, his involvement with the child may give rise to such rights.
In 1989, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in another case relating to
control of a child, as well as parental rights, Michael H. v. Gerald D.99
Michael H. considered a California state statute that required the legal
presumption of paternity when any child was born into an intact
marriage. 100 Consequently, a biological but unmarried father, Michael H.,
was denied visitation rights to his child, where the child was conceived and
born during the mother's marriage to another man. 101 Despite evidence of
active parenting by Michael H., the Supreme Court couched Michael H.'s
89. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
90. 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Philip S. Welt, Adoption and the Constitution: Are Adoptive

ParentsReally "Strangers Without Rights"?, 1995 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 165, 191-93 (stating
that in Caban both the majority and dissent relied upon the importance of the actual,
substantive relationships in the family structure).
91. Caban, 441 U.S. at 381-82.
92. See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 248-49.
93. Caban, 441 U.S. at 382.
94. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247, 249-50.
95. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
96. Caban, 441 U.S. at 388.
97. Id. at 389 n.7.
98. See id.
99. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
100. Id. at 115.
101. Id.
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interest as that of an adulterous parent. 10 2 In denying Michael H. visitation
rights, the court relied on a historical disrespect for an adulterous father, in
spite of a biological relationship.10 3 The Michael H. plurality detached the
right of parenting from biology, upholding the denial of Michael H.'s
parental rights in favor of the marital family. °4 Along the spectrum of
constitutionally protected family rights, Michael H. demonstrates that even
the presence of a biological relationship and parental involvement may be
trumped in certain instances. 10 5 The Supreme Court's handling of the
assorted family constructs from Meyer and Pierce through Stanley, Quilloin
and Michael H. show the expansion of constitutional respect from the
nuclear family to those relationships outside of the traditional nuclear
family.
2. Constitutionally Protected Rights: Defining the Family
Beyond the right to control aspects of a child's life, the Court has
invalidated, in some circumstances, restrictions which prevent groups of
persons from defining themselves as a family. 10 6 In Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, Cleveland's zoning regulations restricted occupancy of a
housing unit to members of a "single family."' 10 7 "Family," as defined by
the ordinance, was limited only to "a few categories of related
individuals."' 108 The petitioner, a grandmother living with her two
grandsons, who were cousins, was outside the scope of the statutory
definition of "family." 10 9 The grandmother challenged Cleveland's zoning
ordinance as an improper restriction on her due process and equal
110
protection rights.
The Moore Court examined a "lineage" of cases "acknowledg[ing] a
'private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."'' I These cases
projected a "rational continuum" which would include expanded protection
for family arrangements under the Due Process Clause. 1 2 Included in this

102. See id. at 120-21.
103. See id. at 124-25.
104. Id. at 132.
105. See infra Part II.B.3.
106. See infra notes 107-15 and accompanying text; see also Pamela Scheininger, Legal
Separateness, Private Connectedness: An Impediment to Gender Equality in the Family, 31

Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 283, 301 n.85 (1998); Laura Bradford, Note, The
Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals to Reform No-Fault Divorce Laws, 49
Stan. L. Rev. 607, 624 (1997).
107. Moore v. City of E.Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,495-96 (1977).
108. Id. at 496.
109. Id. at 497.
110. Id. at496&n.3.
111. Id. at 499 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) and noting
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925)).

112. Id. at 501-02. The Court stated, while prior cases did not specifically address the
circumstance before the Court, the rationale of those cases would apply to additional
situations, including the one at bar, "unless [the Court] close[d their] eyes to the basic
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protection is the freedom from "cutting off any protection of family rights

at the... arbitrary boundary... of the nuclear family." 1" 3 The Court
looked to "[r]ecent census reports" in determining that constitutional
protection related to the family should extend at least as far as "[t]he
tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and... grandparents."' "14 The Court
protected the expanded vision of the constitutional family, and struck down
the Cleveland statute as an improper constriction on family structures under
115
the Due Process Clause.
C. An Additional Considerationin Second-ParentAdoption Cases: The
Hybrid Presenceof Equal Protectionand Due Process
Second-parent adoption may implicate constitutional due process
considerations, as discussed in the context of biological and functional
families. Second-parent adoption also presents a second potential basis for
implicating the Constitution-the equal protection of the homosexual class.
Notably, the Supreme Court has not elevated sexual orientation to the level
of a suspect class entitled to the most heightened level of constitutional

scrutiny.116
This concurrent presence of certain due process (here, family rights) and
equal protection (sexual orientation) interests is not unique to second-parent
adoptions. A number of cases in Supreme Court history have struck down
state legislation when both substantive due process interests and equal
protection interests are implicated, even while the equal protection and due
process elements challenged are generally understood to be distinct. 117

reasons why certain rights associated with the family have been accorded shelter under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." Id. at 501.
113. Id. at 502.
114. Id. at 504 & n.14. The Court also noted the special need for a more inclusive family
definition in "times of adversity, such as... death of a spouse or economic need." Id. at 505.
115. Id. at 506. Conversely, a few years prior to Moore v. City of East Cleveland, in
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, the Court faced a challenge to a New York statute which
limited living arrangements to one-family dwellings. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1, 2 (1974). The owner of a house, who had leased room to six college students,
challenged the ordinance as violative of equal protection and the rights of association, travel,
and privacy where the statute limited a one-family dwelling to the housing of "persons
related by blood, adoption, or marriage." Id. The Court upheld that statute, focusing on the
primacy of the state legislative discretion to draw a line with regards to the scope of
sanctioned living arrangements. Id. at 8. The Moore Court distinguished Belle Terre as a
valid exercise of municipal power to restrict persons of no relation from living together.
Moore, 431 U.S. at 499. For analysis of the Moore Court's treatment of Belle Terre, see
infra Part II.B.4.
116. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-33 (1996) (invalidating an amendment
to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited all legislative, executive, or judicial action
designed to protect homosexual persons from discrimination, but applying a "rational basis"
review indicative of an unprotected class).
117. Jeffrey Goehring, Lawrence v. Texas: Dignity, A New Standard for Substantive
Rational Basis Review, 13 Law & Sexuality 727, 732 (2004) ("Equal application of the law
is a constitutional principle distinct from substantive due process ....
").
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Equal protection and due process principles have similar roots, finding
their foundation in the "teachings of history [and a] recognition of...
values." 118 Since these protections are birthed from related values, it is
logical that they have been intertwined in their growth. The Supreme Court
has noted that "[e]quality of treatment and the due process right to demand
respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are
linked in important respects." ' 1 9 This link is especially demonstrable in
cases, such as with second-parent adoptions, where the protectionist
ambitions of both equal protection and substantive due process bear equal
relevance to the challenged legislation.
Almost unanimously, state laws are not invalidated when the challenged
basis is a single equal protection or due process interest, which triggers only
a review for a rational basis. 120 It has been posited that when a state
restriction is invalidated under "rational basis" review, the Court has
actually cloaked an increased level of examination and scrutiny under the
name of rational basis. 12 1 The impetus for a heightened level of scrutiny,
and increased constitutional weight, where suspect classifications or
fundamental rights are absent, may come from "a narrative in which due
process and equal protection, far from having separate missions and
entailing different inquiries, are profoundly interlocked in a legal double
helix." 122 Under this "double helix," "certain fundamental facets of
118. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 & n.10 (finding that "similar restraint[s]" mark the
approach to substantive due process and equal protection).
119. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003); cf Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism,
112 Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1999). Professor Amar notes that, for the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment, "the Equal Protection Clause was in part a clarifying gloss on the due process
idea" rather than an expression of a separate notion. Id. at 772. Amar demonstrates a
"marriage" of due process and equal protection interests as early as 1896:
[Justice John Marshall Harlan] proclaims that the "guarantees of life, liberty and
property are for all persons within the jurisdiction ... without discrimination
against any because of their race".... [T]his formulation marries due process
language ("life, liberty, and property") with equal protection language ("all
persons within the jurisdiction," a phrase found only in the Equal Protection
Clause) and equal protection norms against race discrimination.
Id. at 773 (quoting Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896) (Harlan, J.)).
120. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 459 n.4 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
121. Id.
122. Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "FundamentalRight" that DareNot Speak
Its Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1893, 1898 (2004); see also Nan D. Hunter, Gay Rights After
Lawrence v. Texas: Living with Lawrence, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1103, 1135 (2004).
In cases where the Court has confronted claims of not-quite-deprivation of
liberty, as experienced by persons in not-quite-suspect classes, it has in practice
displayed a willingness to take into account a kind of cross-doctrinal cumulative
weighting of the interests involved and the consequences of adverse legal
treatment.
Id. For a discussion of the Court's use of a hybrid analysis in the area of economic
regulation, see Rebecca E. Zietlow, Exploring a Substantive Approach to Equal Justice
Under Law, 28 N.M. L. Rev. 411, 424 (1998). Professor Zietlow recognizes the Court's
tendency to combine elements of equal protection and due process, and then to decide the
case "without determining which clause was the deciding principle," instead emphasizing the

2005]

TYING THE BRAID OF SECOND-PARENT ADOPTIONS

1441

freedom have won fierce protection... even when they have defied easy
124
labeling."' 123 The Supreme Court's opinions in Loving v. Virginia,
Skinner v. Oklahoma,125 Zablocki v. Redhail,126 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 127 and

Lawrence v. Texas 128 evince an increasing reliance on the amalgamation of
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to invalidate state regulation,
an amalgamation which may also occur with second-parent adoptions.
1. Loving v. Virginia
A seminal case for the co-presence of challenges under both the Equal
Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is Loving v. Virginia.129 In Loving, a Virginia statute
prohibited marriage-between a white person and a nonwhite person. 130 A
married, interracial couple, 13 1 previously convicted of violating the statute,

fundamental nature of the interest and the way in which it is applied unequally. Id. at 424-25;
see also Randal S. Jeffrey, Restricting Prisoners' Equal Access to the Federal Courts: The
Three Strikes Provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act and Substantive Equal
Protection, 49 Buff. L. Rev. 1099, 1128 (2001) (discussing poverty and access to the court
system as creating "a hybrid of the fundamental right and suspect classification" resulting in
a "substantive equal protection"); Sundeep Kothari, Comment, And Justicefor All: The Role
Equal Protection and Due Process Principles Have Played in Providing Indigents with
Meaningful Access to the Courts, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 2159 (1998). One student commentator
discusses Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956), a case concerning a state law restriction
of appellate reviews relating to the defendants' wealth status, a classification deprived of
special constitutional protection. Kothari, supra, at 2174. The student commentator states,
"The plurality's opinion showed that an amalgamation of equal protection and due process
was a more potent force than the separate use of either." Id. at 2176. The student also notes
the dissent, in which Justice Harlan takes issue with the doctrine employed by the majority,
and asserts that "neither the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause was a
sufficient source to establish this new right of free transcripts for criminal defendants." Id.
The Court has acknowledged that constitutional protections may merge in order to provide
protection that neither would provide alone. Cf. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (suggesting that "the First Amendment bars application of a
neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action... [only when] the Free
Exercise Clause" acts "in conjunction with other constitutional protections").
123. See Tribe, supra note 122, at 1898.
124. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
125. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
126. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
127. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
128. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
129. 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, Constitutional
Law 559 (14th ed. 2001).
130. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
131. See Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute in
Historical Perspective, 52 Va. L. Rev. 1189, 1210 (1966). Richard and Mildred Loving,
residents of Virginia, had traveled from their home state to the District of Columbia in order
to be married. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2. Upon return and cohabitation, the couple was arrested
and convicted under the Virginia anti-miscegenation statute. Id. at 2-3. They were sentenced
to one year in jail, with the sentence suspended provided they left Virginia and did not return
for twenty-five years. Id. at 3.

1442

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

challenged the law as an invalid infringement of certain equal protection
32
interests, as well as certain due process rights. 1
The Loving Court, led by Chief Justice Earl Warren, found that the racial
marriage restriction mandated a review of the legislation with a "most rigid
scrutiny."' 13 3 Under this highest tier of scrutiny, the Court dismissed the
notion of procedural equality, 134 finding that the statute was "invidious
racial discrimination" and simply the "maint[enance] of White Supremacy";
this was not a legitimate purpose for a state law. 135 The Court ultimately
held that "[t]here can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry
solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the
136
Equal Protection Clause."'
Parallel to the equal protection interest at hand, the Court noted the
statutory burden placed on Virginia residents' marriage interest. 137 The
Court stated that the "freedom of choice to marry ...a person of another
race" is an individual one, and as such the statute was an improper
"depriv[ation of] the [petitioners'] liberty.., in violation of the Due
38
Process Clause."'
Thus, "Loving was not simply an equal protection case;" rather, much
like the dual constitutional interests in second-parent adoptions, the dual
discussions of equal protection of the multiple racial classifications and the
liberty interest in marriage represented the operation of both the Equal
Protection Clause and Due Process Clause "in tandem."1 39 Professor
Pamela Karlan takes specific note of the Court's adoption of an equal
protection rationale from Skinner v. Oklahoma in order to flesh out its own
"Due Process Clause-based argument" related to the liberty interest in
marriage. 140
Thus, the Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence was
intertwined with the Due Process Clause doctrinal analysis, a networking of
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses which, Karlan notes, was "a
14 1
hallmark of the Warren Court."'

132. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2. The equal protection interests was based in the unequal
access of to marriage to a black man available to white women as compared with black
women; the due process interest was the protection from burdens on marriage.
133. Id. at 11.
134. Id.
135. Id.

136. Id. at 12.
137. Id.
138. Id. The Court noted the denial of a liberty interest within the construct of an unequal
protection: "To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial
classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the
principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the
State's citizens of liberty without due process of law." Id.
139. See Pamela Karlan, Loving Lawrence, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1447, 1448 (2004).
140. Id.; see also infra Part I.C.2.

141. Karlan, supra note 139, at 1448-49 & n.12. Professor Karlan posits that this merger
of the established equal protection jurisprudence with the protected liberty interest "mark[s]
the rebirth of substantive due process." Id.
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2. Skinner v. Oklahoma
The co-presence of substantive due process and equal protection is also
palpable in Skinner v. Oklahoma.14 2 The Skinner Court confronted a
prisoner who had been convicted of stealing chickens and twice convicted
of robbery with firearms within a period of eight years. 14 3 Oklahoma's
Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act punished by sterilization those persons
who habitually committed crimes of moral turpitude. 144 Excepted from the
of
definition of "moral turpitude" were "offenses arising out of the violation 145
the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses."'
The highest state court in Oklahoma enforced the habitual criminal statute,
and punished the prisoner with an "operation of vasectomy."' 146 Skinner
petitioned the Supreme Court to overturn the punishment on the basis of
procedural due process as well as a claim of cruel and unusual
punishment.147
The Court dismissed the petitioner's reasoning, and discussed the validity
of the legislation in terms of equal protection and due process. 14 8 First, the
statute burdened any due process interest the prisoner held in
had a disparate application to
procreation. 149 Additionally, the statute
150
different classes of criminal offenders.
In order to invalidate the state penalty, the Skinner Court traversed the
paths of both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The Court
labeled the statute as an improper interference with "a right which is basic
to the perpetuation of a race-the right to have offspring," language
15 1
characteristic of protection derived from the Due Process Clause.
Despite language that implicates due process protection, the Court's
invalidation of the statute was rooted not in due process, but rather in the
Equal Protection Clause: The Court stated that "the law lays an unequal
hand on those who have committed... the same quality of offense, and
152
sterilizes one and not the other."
It is important to note that Skinner v. Oklahoma does not fall within the
construct of a strict scrutiny-type case. 153 Even the sitting Court recognized
142. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
143. Id. at 537.
144. Id. at 536.
145. Id. at 537.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 538.
148. Id. at 537-43.
149. Id. at 541.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 536. This language is redolent of fundamental rights, substantive due process
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §
2.
152. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.

153. That is a case addressing a challenge of a legislative restriction on a constitutionally
protected class. For a criticism of the Court's choice of equal protection, the "conceptual
theory of the narrowest possible decision-making," see Norman Dorsen, Editor's

1444

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

that the strict scrutiny lens could not be derivative of the class restricted by
the Oklahoma statute-convicted felons-which is not a suspect category
entitled to heightened constitutional protection. 154 Alternatively, the notion
that the strict scrutiny sprung from the felons' constitutional interest in
procreation is attenuated: The right to procreate, within the unique context
of state sterilization, was not clearly established as fundamental. 155 In fact,
the Supreme Court had actually condoned the employment of involuntary
156
sterilization, and the Skinner Court avoided overturning that precedent.
As a practical matter, and inapposite to the establishment of the right as
fundamental, a number of states continued to employ restrictions on the
procreation liberty interests in the form of involuntary sterilization
penalties. 157 Thirty-five years after the Court decided Skinner over half of
the states still enforced sterilization laws for a variety of classes, including
1 58
"habitual criminals."'
A more palatable solution may be found in the interplay of the due
process and equal protection doctrines. 159 The punishment and legislation
would not have been overturned were it not for the presence of both an
equal protection and substantive due process interest. 160 Where the Court
looked at both the equal protection and due process interests
simultaneously, the lopsided application (unavailable to criminals) of a
quasi-liberty interest (the right to procreate) created a heightened awareness
Introduction, The ProperRole of the United States Supreme Court in Civil Liberties Cases,
10 Wayne L. Rev. 457, 472 (1964).
154. "I seriously doubt that the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause requires [the legislation] to
apply the measure to all criminals in the first instance, or to none." Skinner, 316 U.S. at 543
(Stone, J., concurring); see also Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felonsfrom Jury Service, 53
Am. U. L. Rev 65, 89 (2003); Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 Harv. L.
Rev. 828 (1999). Felons are often constrained more than non-felons, and it has been noted
that if "[Skinner] involved the imposition of a prison sentence for one but not for the other of
two similar offenses, there is little question that the Court would have approved the disparity
as rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from
Incarceration: Why Is this Right Differentfrom All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 781,
797 (1994).
155. See infra notes 157-59.
156. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 542-43; Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
157. Jana Leslie Miller, From Bell to Bell: Responsible Reproduction in the Twentieth
Century, 8 Md. J. Contemp. Legal Issues 123, 132 (1997).
158. "Of the states with eugenic sterilization laws as of 1968, the feebleminded or
mentally deficient were subject to sterilization in all 27, the mentally ill in 25, epileptics in
14, habitual criminals in 7, and moral degenerates and sexual perverts in 7." Jeffrey F.
Ghent, Annotation, Validity of Statutes Authorizing Asexualization or Sterilization of
Criminalsor Mental Defectives, 53 A.L.R.3d 960, § 2(a) (2004) (internal quotation omitted).
159. See Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 492-93 (12th ed. 1991) (noting the
extraordinary situation in Skinner. the mixing of due process, and the absence of a "specific
constitutional guarantee"); see also Gretchen Ritter, Women's Citizenship and the Problem
of Legal Personhood in the United States in the 1960's and 1970's, 13 Tex. J. Women & L.
1, 31 & n. 182 (2003) (noting the "bring[ing] together" of due process and equal protection in
a handful of high court cases, including Skinner).
160. See Sullivan & Gunther, supra note 129, at 509 (stating that the unequal
classifications regarding criminals would not have been overturned were it not for the
presence of a "basic civil right[] of man").
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of a constitutional
conflict, and placed a greater burden of justification on
1 61
state.
the
3. Zablocki v. Redhail
In Zablocki v. Redhail,16 2 the Supreme Court again reviewed a challenge
which implicated both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clausesspecifically, a class action challenge to a Wisconsin statute that refused a
marriage license to those residents who were obligated to support children
not in their custody. 16 3 In order to overcome this denial, the party seeking
marriage was required to obtain "a court order granting permission."'164
Permission from the court necessitated proof that the resident's previous
"minor issue" would not become "public charges."' 165 The petitioner
challenged the statute as an invalid legislative restriction under the Equal
66
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Zablocki Court intermingled notions of the equal protection of
wealth-based classes and the substantive due process right in marriage,
finally applying an equal protection-based strict scrutiny to invalidate the
state statute. 167 The Court began by framing the examination as an inquiry
under the Equal Protection Clause. 168 However, the Court swiftly moved to
dialogue concerning rights protected by the Due Process Clause,
specifically engaging in a chronology of the "fundamental importance" of
the right to marry. 169 Rather than bifurcate the analysis into separate equal
protection and due process contingents, the Court interwove discussion of
the two interests, ultimately recognizing that the due process marriage

161. Professor Lawrence Tribe's complementing theory of the interplay of due process
and equal protection asserts the Court's cognizance of the
inequality in the way government would wield the surgeon's scalpel if given the
power to control the choice of who may have offspring and who must be prevented
from leaving a genetic trace in succeeding generations as an important factor in the
judicial decision to treat the underlying liberty as fundamental.
Tribe, supra note 122, at 1902 n.32.
162. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 375.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 376-77. The petitioner challenged the statute as a substantial abridgement of
the right to marry and, alternatively, as an improper discrimination of a wealth based
classification. Brief of Appellees at 16, 23, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (No.
76-879), availableat 1977 WL 189327.
167. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 376-77 ("[Aippaellee brought this class action ...challenging
the statute as violative of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
168. ld. at 383 ("In evaluating [the statute] under the Equal Protection Clause, 'we must
first determine what burden of justification the classification created thereby must
meet ... ' (quoting Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 253 (1974)).
169. ""Marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very
existence and survival."' Id. ((quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (quoting
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942))).
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interests were at the core of the equal protection analysis.' 70 Justice
Thurgood Marshall, writing for the Court, applied strict scrutiny, and
dismissed the statute as an invalid restriction on marriage because it
unnecessarily interfered with the right to marry. 171 While braiding both the
due process and equal protection analyses, the Court withheld prohibition
on all restrictions on marriage, stating that only some burdens on the marital
72
relationship would be permitted.'
The necessity of the braiding of these interests becomes more evident
when each interest is reviewed individually. If the constitutional due
process interest related to marriage was treated as distinct from the equal
protection interest, then it might have been argued that the basis for Justice
Marshall's application of strict scrutiny was found in the constitutional
weight attached to marriage-a liberty which has received some shelter in
Supreme Court precedent.1 73 Yet, the substantive due process right to
marry, as defined by the Zablocki Court, is not a wholly fundamental right.
The marriage right structured by the Zablocki majority appears, to some
extent, hollowed; the Court hedges the "right" of marriage almost
immediately after confirming its existence, by noting that a number of
regulations on marriage could "legitimately be imposed.' 74 Further, as a
historical matter and inapposite to a finding of the right to marry as a
fundamental right, access to marriage has been withheld from a number of
classes, including "Black Americans" and "genetic undesirables.' '175 A
concurring Justice Powell noted that although the right of marriage is
somewhat protected by the Constitution, "the Court has yet to hold that all
regulation touching ...a 'fundamental right' trigger[s] the most exacting
judicial scrutiny."' 176 The exclusion of homosexuals from marriage also
evinces the gaps in the fundamental nature of the right to marry. 177
Theoretically, an alternative to finding that the strict scrutiny analysis
was birthed from any constitutional interest in marriage, strict review in
Zablocki, as stated in the opinion, may derive from a constitutional interest
in the equal protection of the indigent. However, on multiple occasions the
170. Id. at 383-85 (employing a rationale which interwove analysis "under the Equal
Protection Clause" and included a consideration of the "violation of the Equal Protection
Clause" in Loving v. Virginia, and "the right 'to marry, establish a home and bring up
children' . . . protected by the Due Process Clause").
171. Id. at 388.
172. Id. at 386. "By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do
not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or

prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny." Id.
173. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
174. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
175. See Adam B. Wolf, Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition and Fundamental Rights, 57

U. Miami L. Rev. 101, 116 (2002) (criticizing the Zablocki Court for not explaining how
tradition has made the right to marry fundamental, and stating that "United States history is
replete with examples of the systematic denial of the right to marry").
176. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 399.
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Court has withheld suspect classification, and strict scrutiny equal
178
protection treatment, from financial or wealth-based challenges.
Specifically, in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 179 the Court stated,
"We have ...rejected the suggestion that statutes having different effects
on that account alone be subjected to
on the wealthy and the poor should
180
strict equal protection scrutiny."'
Finally, a view consistent with the history of marriage rights, the
majority's actual language and a hybrid equal protection-due process
scheme may lie in Justice John Paul Stevens's concurring opinion in
Zablocki. Stevens found the impetus for strict scrutiny and legislative
in
invalidation not in the innate fundamental quality of marriage, but rather 181
the unequal administration of the sometimes protected marital interest.
Thus, the quasi-fundamental right of marriage analysis takes into account
the unprotected, but unequal, classification, resulting in a more powerful
amalgamation when the two quasi-fundamental rights are recognized in
tandem.
4. M.L.B. v. S.L.J.
Another example of the co-presence of equal protection and due process
in the arena of family law occurred in M.L.B. v. S.L.J.182 In M.L.B., the
Court confronted a family law dispute in which a divorced father, who
maintained custody of his children, had successfully terminated his exwife's (M.L.B.'s) parental rights to allow the adoption of the children by his
new spouse. 183 The lower court .had noted that the permission for the
termination of M.L.B.'s parental rights was statutorily endorsed following
the "erosion of the relationship184between the parent and child[ren]" caused in
part by neglect by the mother.
Subsequently, the biological mother, M.L.B., appealed the termination of
rights; Mississippi law required M.L.B. to submit transcripts of the previous
proceedings in order to proceed with the appeal. 185 The transcript fees were
estimated at $2352.36, an amount M.L.B. could not afford. 186 When
87
Mississippi courts denied her application to proceed in forma pauperis,1
M.L.B. challenged the Mississippi ruling as an improper equal protection
178. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (denying suspect classification and
strict scrutiny to an indigent woman).
179. 487 U.S. 450 (1988).
180. Id. at 458.
181. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 404 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice John Paul Stevens notes
that while "[t]he individual's interest.., is sufficiently important to merit special
constitutional protection.... [i]t is not.., an interest which is constitutionally immune from
evenhanded regulation." Id. (citations omitted).
182. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
183. Id. at 107.
184. Id. at 108 n.1.
185. Id. at 108-09.
186. Id. at 109.
187. Id.
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infringement based on wealth, as well as an improper burden on the
1 88
protected due process area of the family.
The Supreme Court overturned the statute as unconstitutional without
clarity as to whether the source of the constitutional protection was the
Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, or both. 189 In the
invalidation, the Court relied primarily on Griffin v. Illinois,190 a case that
struck down a state statute requiring a criminal appellant to pay transcript
costs. 19 1 Central to the plurality holding in Griffin was the notion that while
neither the classification of the indigent criminal appellee, nor access to
criminal appellate review were constitutionally protected categories, the
Court could draw "support from" both "the Due Process and Equal
92
Protection Clauses."'
The M.L.B. Court also looked to previous, expanded applications of the
Griffin doctrine: the threading of equal protection and due process in a
"narrow category of civil cases in which the State must provide access to its
judicial proces'ses without regard to a party's ability to pay court fees."' 19 3
The M.L.B. Court noted that while Griffin did not extend generally to the
"broad array of civil cases,"' 194 there was something peculiar about those
'19 5
cases "involving state controls or intrusions on family relationships.'
The Court ultimately framed the constitutional issue in terms of equal
access to the appellate court in light of the biological mother's interest in
"affiliation with her children," and found that the state legislation was
proscribed by the sphere of protection "established by ... past decisions" in

188. Id. at 107.
189. Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence:
Recognizing the Co-Constitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1209,

1242.
190. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
191. Id. at 20; see also supra note 122.

192. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 110. "[I]n the Court's Griffin-line cases, '[d]ue process and
equal protection principles converge' ....
A 'precise rationale' has not been composed,
because cases of this order 'cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole[d]
analysis."' Id. at 120 (citations omitted) (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665
(1983)).
193. Id. at 113. Specifically the Court noted Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1979),

a case invalidating a state restriction which required the payment of court costs prior to
obtaining a divorce, and Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), in which the Court rejected
Oregon's double-bond requirement because it burdened a particular class of litigants, evicted
tenants, a barrier "faced by no other civil litigant in Oregon." M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 113-14
(quoting Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 79).
194. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 116. The Court noted that the "general rule" was that fee
requirements were "examined only for rationality" which was satisfied by "need for
revenue." Id. at 123.
195. Id. at 116. The M.L.B. Court then segued to dual holdings concerned with the
discontinuation of parental rights, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham City,
452 U.S. 18 (1981), and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), which underscored the
importance of the interest parents held in their relationship with their children. M.L.B., 519
U.S. at 119. The Court found that the exception to the "mine run of cases," and the propriety
of a subsequent application of the Griffin doctrine, is found in cases relating to the
termination of parental rights. Id. at 123.
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the Griffin line. 196
This "Griffin line," inexorably, relies on the
97
convergence of due process and equal protection. 1
While the Court concluded that most of the cases in its cited precedent,
the cases of the Griffin line, "rested on equal protection grounds," a
concurring Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that "three of the decisions on
which the majority relied rested exclusively on the Due Process Clause." 19 8
Significantly, the braiding of the due process and equal protection
interests is evinced by the dissent of Justice Clarence Thomas, where the
majority is criticized for "perpetuating 'ambiguity' by not .specifying the
199
constitutional source for its holding."'
"[C]rucial to the understanding of the meaning of M.L.B." is the absence
of a single fundamental constitutional right-first the Court conceded that
200
the Constitution did not require any appeal of a judicial determination.
Further, any constitutional equal protection given to wealth-based classes is
minimal, if existent at all. 20 1 Professor Julie A. Nice notes that "[r]ather
than holding that parental rights were fundamental or quasi-fundamental
(what the Court considered but did not hold) or that poor parents were a
suspect or quasi-suspect class (what the Court never suggested), M.L.B.
melded consideration of the right and class, emphasizing the interaction
between them." 20 2 Thus, it can be reasoned that the "majority combined"
the attendant rights, rooting the decision in an acknowledgment of the
duality of the "denial of a fairly important right (a civil appeal challenging
termination of parental rights) from a relatively targeted class (parents who
cannot afford the requisite appellate fees). 20 3
5. Lawrence v. Texas
The Court's latest decision in the grey area where equal protection and
due process converge occurred in Lawrence v. Texas.20 4 In Lawrence,
Houston police entered the apartment of one of the petitioners in response
to a reported "weapons disturbance" call.20 5 The police discovered the
petitioners engaged in homosexual activity. 20 6 The men were subsequently

196. Id. at 119, 120.
197. See Nice, supra note 189, at 1243 (referring to Boddie, Lassiter, and Santosky).

Additionally Justice Clarence Thomas criticized the majority, stating "If neither Clause
affords petitioner the right to a free, civil-appeal transcript, I assume that no amalgam of the
two does." M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 130 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Nice, supra note 189, at 1243.
198. Nice, supra note 189, at 1243.
199. Id. (quoting M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 130 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
200. Id. This differs from the claim to any initial review and fairness hearing, a right
mandated by Stanley v. Illinois. See supra text accompanying note 85.
201. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 110; see also supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
202. Nice, supra note 189, at 1247.
203. Id. at 1247 n.222, 1248.
204. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
205. Id. at 562.
206. Id. at 563.
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in
convicted under Texas's state statute that made it a crime to "engage[]
20 7
same-sex."
the
of
individual
another
with
intercourse
deviate sexual
The Court granted certiorari to review the petitioners' challenges that the
statute violated the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 8 The defendants argued that the restriction
on homosexual sodomy was improper under the Equal Protection Clause
20 9
because it applied unevenly to heterosexual and homosexual classes.
restriction violated the Due Process
Second, the defendants argued, the
2 10
Clause's protected right of privacy.
A majority of the Lawrence Court agreed with the petitioners' due
process challenge. 211 . The Court found that the restriction on the act, or
perhaps the relationship, contested in Lawrence fell within a sphere of
interests protected from state interference created by the Court's previous
cases: Griswold v. Connecticut212-protecting a privacy interest in striking
down state restrictions on contraception; Eisenstadt v. Baird-also striking
down restrictions on access to contraception, and declaring "the right of the
individual.., to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
214matters so fundamentally affecting a person"; 213 and Roe v. Wade
protecting an aspect of "fundamental significance in defining the rights of
2 15
the person."
As the petitioners' challenge suggested, due process was not the sole
interest present in the case; rather, it was accompanied by an equal
protection interest as well. 2 16 While the Court ostensibly held the
restriction invalid under the Due Process Clause, 2 17 it also noted that the
equal protection challenge, the claim that unfair application to homosexuals
as compared to heterosexuals was unconstitutional, was a "tenable
argument. '2 18 Indeed, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, concurring in the

207. Id. "Deviate sexual intercourse" included "(A) any contact between ... the genitals
of one person and the mouth or anus of another; or (B) the penetration of the genitals or the
anus of another with an object." Id.
208. Id. at 564.
209. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 11, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No.
02-102).
210. Id. at 1, 3.
211. Lawrence, 538 U.S. at 578-79.

212. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
213. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
214. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
215. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
216. Id. at 574.
217. The Court felt it important to address the challenge on the grounds of Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), in order to show that Bowers "was wrong the day it was
decided." See Tribe, supra note 122, at 1909 (quoting Planned Parenthood of So. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992)).
218. Lawrence, 538 U.S. at 574. "As an alternative argument in this case, counsel for the
petitioners and some amici contend that Romer provides the basis for declaring the Texas
statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. That is a tenable argument, but we
conclude the instant case requires us to address whether Bowers itself has continuing
validity." Id. at 574-75. The Court stated further that "[e]quality of treatment and the due
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judgment, reasoned that the state restriction was constitutionally invalid
solely on the tenets of the Equal Protection Clause. 2 19 O'Connor stated that
220
the "Texas statute makes homosexuals unequal in the eyes of the law."
Thus, Lawrence presents another scenario that evidences the co-presence of
equal protection and due process interests.
In the Court's examination of the rights implicated by the statute, the
majority refrained from classifying any right of the petitioner as
fundamental. 22 1 However, the Court also shied away from the opposite
extreme, that of rational basis review, refusing to "analyze the Texas
sodomy law in the deferential manner that it uses when only a rational basis
is required. '222 Historically, Due Process Clause jurisprudence has stressed
the importance of a clear statement of any "fundamental liberty interest" at
issue. 223 While the Lawrence Court promulgated the Due Process Clause as
the appropriate shelter for the petitioner's right,
it failed to provide a
"careful description" of the protected interests. 2 24
Alternatively, if the opinion is viewed solely from the equal protection
standpoint, the classification present-sexual identity-is not quite a
suspect class deserving of a heightened judicial scrutiny. 22 5 Further, equal
protection jurisprudence mandates as an initial step in an equal protection
challenge the determination of the weight of the classification in order to
determine the level of scrutiny. 226 Yet the Lawrence Court failed to
provide a level of scrutiny on which to proceed. 2 27 The Court may have
discerned both the under-inclusiveness 228 and overbreadth of any
process right [involved] ... are linked iffimportant respects, and a decision on the latter
point advances both interests." Id. at 575.
219. Id. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
220. Id. at 581.
221. See Hunter, supra note 122, at 1114 ("[Tlhe Court's text makes clear that it is
somehow a core right, but never crosses the line into denominating it as fundamental ... .
222. Id.
223. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); Karlan, supra note 139, at
1450 n. 18.
224. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (citations omitted); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586
(Scalia, J. dissenting) ("Though there is discussion of 'fundamental proposition[s],' and
'fundamental decisions,' nowhere does the Court's opinion declare that homosexual sodomy
is a 'fundamental right' under the Due Process Clause." (citations omitted)); cf id. at 567
(framing the claim as more than "the right to engage in certain sexual conduct"); Arthur S.
Leonard, Lawrence v. Texas and the New Law of Gay Rights, 30 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 189, 197

(2004) ("Justice Kennedy never actually explains what the full scope of 'liberty' is or why
'homosexual conduct' comes within it.").
225. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.

226. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (citing Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250, 253 (1974)) (noting that an examination under the Equal Protection
Clause requires a determination of which burden the restriction must meet).
227. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority fails to
"subject the Texas law to the standard of review that would be appropriate (strict scrutiny)");
see also Karlan, supra note 139, at 1450.
228. Presumably, if the equal protection argument were to hold, the state of Texas could
still prohibit sodomy, if the prohibition were applied to all persons. Cf Meghan M. Peterson,
The Right Decision for the Wrong Reason: The Supreme Court Correctly Invalidates the
Texas Homosexual Sodomy Statute, but Rather than Finding an Equal Protection Violation

1452

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

decision 229 based on a constitutionally protected equal treatment of sexual
preference classification.
Inapposite to jurisprudential procedure of either a discrete, singular
version of equal protection or due process, the Court described the
petitioners' liberty interest at a level of generality that encompassed both
due process and equal protection concerns, allowing "the Court [to] recast
the right as involving not just autonomy but equality as well."23 °
The Lawrence Court's threading of the due process and equal protection
interests has been noted particularly in the Court's treatment of Bowers v.
Hardwick.23 1 Professor Nan D. Hunter posits that in overturning Bowers,
the Lawrence Court adopted the Bowers dissent of Justice Stevens,
specifically Stevens's use and acknowledgment of "liberty," rather than the
Bowers dissent of Justice Harry Blackmun, which is pervaded by the
constitutional right of "privacy." 232 In this sense, the Court avoids directly
categorizing the Lawrence protection as solely birthed from the due process
privacy line from Griswold v. Connecticut to Roe v. Wade.233 Stevens's
234
Bowers dissent is seen, instead, as an extension of Eisentstadt v. Baird
where Justice William Brennan braided privacy-the right to
contraception-with equal protection-the unmarried versus the marriedby stating that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion." 235 It follows that a foundation of the Lawrence decision is
Stevens's Bowers dissent, which
"weaves together privacy and equality
2 36
themes in a ... seamless way."
In a fashion similar to Stevens's Bowers dissent, 2 37 the Lawrence
decision allows the equal protection realities to intermingle with the due
process liberties. The Court takes note of the unequal effect of burdening
the relationship liberty with state restriction: notably, the actual and

in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court Incorrectly and Unnecessarily Overrules Bowers v.

Hardwick, 37 Creighton L. Rev. 653 (2004) (arguing that Bowers v. Hardwick, permitting
the restriction of homosexual sodomy, was unnecessarily overturned by Lawrence where the
Court may have held the Texas statute invalid under equal protection).
229. A holding solely on equal protection may elevate homosexuals to a protected class
and have ramifications on marital rights. Cf Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J.
dissenting).
230. Karlan, supra note 139, at 1452.
231. 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.1 (1986) (upholding a Georgia statute making it a crime to
perform or submit to "any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth
or anus of another").
232. See Hunter, supra note 122, at 1106-07.
233. Id. at 1105-06.
234. "Stevens's central move is to extend the Eisenstadt logic .... Justice Stevens makes
equal treatment under the law the logical fulcrum of his dissent; it is the critical insertion of
the equal protection point which extends the liberty (privacy) right to Michael Hardwick."
Id. at 1108.
235. Id. (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
236. Id.
237. Id. ("The same quality of interwoven doctrine is the hallmark of Lawrence.").
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theoretical stigmatization of criminalizing homosexuality. 238 Thus, while
the decision is professed to be a protection under the Due Process Clause,
the Court's concern with liberty was just as much about the equality of
protection the liberty receives. 2 39 Lawrence's dual concern marks the apex
of hybrid analysis, "presuppos[ing] and advanc[ing] an explicitly equalitybased.., theory of substantive liberty" more than "any other decision in
240
Supreme Court[] history."
A general description encompassing the dual interests is necessary to tell
Lawrence's "single, unfolding tail of equal liberty and increasingly
universal dignity." 24 1 Without recognition of the dual interests the Court
would have blinded itself to the degree of constitutional offensiveness the
statute represented. Thus, the "Lawrence Court's discussion of liberty
would be incoherent without some underlying commitment to equality
among groups."

24 2

The line of cases displaying the co-presence of quasi-fundamental rights
and quasi-suspect classes display a possible tendency of the Supreme Court
to rely on multiple constitutional considerations in order to strike down
invasive state regulations. In addition to the use of due process-equal
protection hybrids as a mode of constitutional doctrine, the Court has
shown a shift towards the recognition of an expanded "constitutional
family."
Having developed the distinctions of adoption categories, as well as
provided a factual background for the constitutional implications of
adoptions, including the expanded family and the co-presence of due
process and equal protection interests, this Note will next address a conflict
that exists in the contemporary judicial treatment of the second-parent
adoption mechanism.
II. EXTRACTIONS FROM THE LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE

This part describes certain often differing jurisprudential approaches to
family law, beginning with the conflicting legal treatment of second-parent
adoptions, and more specifically the contrasting approaches to the statutory
mandate that the biological parent's rights to the child are severed when an
adoption occurs. The disparate state laws accept second-parent adoptions
only in some instances, often reject them, and in some instances show only
ambivalence. Next, this part briefly describes the conflicting social views
238. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003); Tribe, supra note 122, at 1905 ("The
stigmatization of same-sex relationships is concretized and aggravated by the law's
denunciation as criminal of virtually the only ways of consummating sexual intimacy
possible in such relationships.").
239. Karlan, supra note 139, at 1458 ("[W]hatever the Court chooses to call it, [it] is as
much a claim about equality as it is a claim about liberty."); Tribe, supra note 122, at 1898.
240. See Tribe, supra note 122, at 1898.
241. Id.; see also Karlan, supra note 139, at 1449 ("[Lliberty and equality are more
intertwined in Lawrence than in Loving.").
242. Karlan, supra note 139, at 1449; Tribe, supra note 122, at 1898 (noting that the due
process and equal protection "missions" are "interlocked").
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of second-parent adoption. Finally this part details certain scholarly
interpretations of the Supreme Court's approach to state restrictions on
particular family relationships.243
A. Family Law and Attitudes to Second-ParentAdoptions
Family law, including second-parent adoptions, is traditionally placed
strictly within the purview of state 'control. 244 Certain constitutional
theories promote a level of federal inaction with regard to family law,
"deferring to the.., state courts, which traditionally have controlled and
developed expertise in family law. '245 In addition to the specialization of
state courts, placing family law exclusively at the state level decentralizes
the strength of the federal government in its encouragement of any
particular values or morals. 246 The result is a diversity of states and
experimentation at the state level, generally seen as beneficial effects of
247
limited federal involvement.
Alternately, there is a point where the interests of localism are
superceded by the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. At this point, a
function of the federal government arises-manifested through the
protection of certain fundamental rights. Conflict over the placement of the
line which runs between state sovereignty in family law, on one side, and
the corrective hand of the federal government, on the other, is the
framework upon which the right to, or decision
to withhold the right of,
248
second-parent adoption should be viewed.

243. See supra Part I.B.
244. See D. Kelly Weisburg & Susan Frelich Appleton, Modem Family Law, at xxxiii (2d
ed. 2002) ("Fundamental to family law today.., is the tension between respect for family
privacy and deference to state authority.); see also Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism,
and the Federal Courts, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 1073, 1073 (1994) ("Whether family law belongs
in the federal courts under diversity jurisdiction is somewhat contested within federal court
jurisprudence."). The Supreme Court has identified the primacy of state legislatures and
courts, in some instances, to develop family-related regulations. See, e.g., Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392-93 n.13 (1979) (identifying the right of the state to set some
confines of child custody proceedings). Further, the Supreme Court has struck down federal
legislation for fear of its effect on the state's ability to promulgate family law. See United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (rejecting reasoning which would allow Congress
to regulate "family law (including marriage, divorce and child custody)").
245. Cahn, supra note 244, at 1074-75 (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of
FederalCourts Law, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1141, 1143-44 (1988)); see also Dailey, supra note 7, at
1792 (1995) (promoting a "localist theory of family law" which includes "adoption, foster
care, and child welfare laws").
246. See Dailey, supra note 7, at 1872.
247. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) ("There must be
power in the States and the Nation to remould, through experimentation, our economic
practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs.").
248. See Dailey, supra note 7, at 1880 ("The federal government always operates in the
area of family law against a background of presumptive state authority.").
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Only three states, California, Connecticut, and Vermont, specifically
provide codified vehicles for second-parent adoption. 249
The
overwhelming absence of second-parent adoptions available through state
legislation in the remaining forty-seven states has resulted in discordance
between the structural form of second-parent adoptions, namely the need
for the biological parent to keep their parental rights, and the state statutory
framework of automatic severance of the first parent's rights upon
adoption. 250 This severance of rights is inapposite to the goal of legalizing
25 1
the more inclusive family sought by second-parent advocates.
Additionally, in the strictly textual sense the "step-parent exception" 252
empowers only adoption by a "spouse" to be excepted from the parental
rights severance rule.253 Couching the exception in marital terms is
problematic for the non-married person, or persons not eligible for
marriage; in fact, the exception has been held to be out of reach for persons
254
so situated.
1. Approval of Second-Parent Adoption: Judicial Statute Construction
While three states have explicit statutory approval of second-parent
adoptions, forty-seven states do not. 2 55 In those states permitting secondparent adoptions, while not providing second-parent legislation, a certain
judicial construction has been required in order to permit the second-parent
adoption without a severance of the biological parent's rights. 256 To obtain
authority for a second-parent adoption without specific sanction, the court
must "forego an overly literal and rigid interpretation of state adoption
statutes in order to advance the . . . underlying purpose of promoting the

child's best interests." 257

It is notable that, save one exception, 25 8 no

249. See Hollinger, supra note 14, § 3.06[6], at 3-62 ("These statues are based on the
Uniform Adoption Act (1994) provisions that generally'recognize that right of 'any one' to
seek to adopt for the purpose of creating a parent-child relationship ... .
250. See supra note 31-32 and accompanying text.
251. See Hollinger, supra note 14, § 3.06[6], at 3-61 ("A more difficult issue is whether
existing adoption statutes bar someone who is already a legal parent-through birth or
adoption-from consenting to the adoption of his or her child.., in order for someone else
to assume all parental rights and responsibilities."); Shapiro, supra note 59, at 26-27.
252. See supranote 33 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
254. See In re Adoption of R.B.F. & R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739, 742 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)

(holding that the "step-parent exception," allowing the spouse of a legal parent to adopt a
child without terminating the legal parent's rights, cannot be used in light of the passage of
the state's legislation outlawing same-sex marriages).
255. See Alona R. Croteau, Comment, Voices in the Dark: Second Parent Adoptions
When the Law Is Silent, 50 Loy. L. Rev. 675, 691 (2004) (noting that California,

Connecticut, and Vermont have explicit statutory approval of second-parent adoptions)
256. See Overview, supra note 1.
257. Id.; see also, Wadlington & O'Brien, supra note 15, at 206 ("Courts that have
decided such cases sometimes have engaged in a tortuous process of statutory
interpretation .... ").
258. See Overview, supra note 1.
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permitting second-parent adoption has
judicial interpretation of state2 law
59
been codified into state statute.
Take as an example the case of In re Adoptions of B.L. V.B. & E.L. V.B., in
which the Vermont Supreme Court focused not on the specific "spousal"
verbiage 260 of the stepparent exception, but rather on (i) the absence of a
specific statutory prohibition of second-parent adoptions in the state, and
(ii) the legislative intent of the stepparent exception-securing the first legal
parent's rights.2 6 1 The court allowed the second-parent adoption, holding
that the "general purpose" of the adoption statute was "to clarify and protect
the legal rights of the adopted person ... not to proscribe adoptions by
certain combinations of individuals." 2 62 In re B.L.V.B. is emblematic of a
modem trend, as appellate court rulings in a number of states and the
District of Columbia have sidestepped the strict textualist reading of
adoptions without
adoption statutes in order to allow second-parent
26 3
severance of the first parent's parental rights.
2. Disapproval of Second-Parent Adoption: Explicit Statutes and Judicial
Construction
Certain states read around the rights severance rule in order to
accomplish second-parent adoptions; however, other courts take a
"divergent view[]" and disapprove of this method of judicial
interpretation. 264 These states oppose the shift toward approval of secondparent adoption, and refuse to permit second-parent adoptions. 2 65 In

259. See Schacter, supra note 61, at 935.
260. Section 448 of the Vermont Family code read, in relevant part:
The natural parents of a minor shall be deprived, by the adoption, of all legal right
to control of such minor, and such minor shall be freed from all obligations of
obedience and maintenance to them.... Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions
of this section, when the adoption is made by a spouse of a natural parent,
obligations of obedience to, and rights of inheritance by and through the natural
parent who has intermarried with the adopting parent shall not be affected.
In re Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1273-74 (Vt. 1993) (internal
quotation omitted).
261. Id. at 1274.
262. Id.; see also In re Adoption by S.M.Y., 620 N.Y.S.2d 897, 902-03 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1994) (finding that stepparent adoptions and second-parent adoptions are essentially the
same mechanism, despite the lack of a formalized relationship in second-parent adoptions).
263. Higher courts recognizing second-parent adoptions include, among others, those of
District of Columbia, In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995), Illinois, In re
Petition of K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), Indiana, In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804
N.E.2d 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), Massachusetts, In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d
315 (Mass. 1993), New Jersey, In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), New York, In re Jacob, 636 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1995),
Pennsylvania, In re Adoption of R.B.F. & R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002), Vermont, In re
Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1271. See National Center for Lesbian
Law,
of
Current
A
Snapshot
Adoptions:
Second-parent
Rights,
http://nclrights.org/publications/2ndparentadoptions.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
264. See Hollinger, supra note 14, § 12.0311], at 12-19.
265. See Schacter, supra note 61, at 934.
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266
Mississippi, same-sex couples are expressly prohibited from adopting.
In Florida, the adoption statue2 67 also explicitly prohibits adoptions by
homosexuals, and despite a recent expansion of adoption availability to
include "cohabitating," unmarried couples, Florida's Department of
Children and Families has stated that Florida will continue to favor married
couples.2 68 Utah adoption law proscribes adoptions by persons who
cohabitate but are not married under Utah law. 269 Given that homosexual
marriage is not available under Utah law, this provision effectively
eliminates the possibility for any second-parent family units.
270
Appellate court decisions in a handful of states, including Colorado,
Nebraska, 27 1 Ohio, 272 and Wisconsin, 27 3 have held that second-parent
adoptions are not available under various state adoption statutes. "[T]hese
courts construe as 'mandatory' [the] statutory provisions that call for the
to4the adoption
termination of the rights and duties of a parent who consents 27
of his or her child by anyone other than the parent's spouse."
Further, within a number of other states, trial court approval remains
regional rather than statewide. 27 5 Thus, the inconsistent treatment of
second-parent adoptions on the national level is mirrored on the intrastate
level in a number of states where only limited trial court approval of the
second-parent adoption exists. 276 In these states, such as in Minnesota,
where second-parent adoptions have been approved in only three of the
state's counties, the effects of a lower court approval of second-parent
adoption are limited to the jurisdiction of that particular trial court. 277 So
"insome states, what is allowed one year or in one particular county may
not be okay in a different time or place." 278 What is more, this cloud of
uncertainty regarding second-parent adoption status extends to a number of
states where the courts have not yet addressed second-parent adoptions, or

266. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-17-3(2) (Supp. 2004).
267. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.042(1) (West 2005); Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children and
Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275 (1 lth Cir. 2004) (affirming Florida's ban on gay adoption).
268. See Hollinger, supra note 14, § 3.06[6], at 3-64; Maya Bell, Florida Revamps Rules
for Adoption, Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, Oct. 12, 2003, at LA.
269. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-1 (2002).
270. In re Adoption of T.K.J. & K.A.K., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998). But see In
the Interest of E.M.L.C., 100 P.3d 546 (Col. Ct. App. 2004) (granting visitation rights to an
estranged nonbiological same-sex parent).
271. In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374 (Neb. 2002).
272. In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
273. In the Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994).
274. Hollinger, supra note 14, § 3.06[6], at 3-63.
275. Second-parent adoptions have been approved in some lower courts in Alabama,
Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington. See Overview, supra note 1, at 7; see also
Hollinger supra note 14, § 3.06[6], at 3-63.
276. See infra notes 277-81 and accompanying text.
277. See Lambda Legal, Overview of State Adoption Laws (Dec. 15, 2004),
[hereinafter
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=399
Lambda].
278. See Curry et al., supra note 13, at 3/4.

1458

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

where the decisions favoring second-parent adoption have been sealed. 2 79
Courts in Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wyoming have yet to address or publicly permit second2 80
parent adoptions.
Any shift towards acceptance and promotion of second-parent adoptions,
as described in Part II.A. 1, is not uniform because some "courts and
legislatures are attempting to block.., adoptions by lesbian and gay
couples." 2 81 The national landscape of second-parent adoption is frought
with an undercurrent of opposition and obstacles in forms ranging from
express prohibition to judicial resistance or silence.
In addition, for advocates of second-parent adoption, the danger in
relying on judicial interpretation of a particular state adoption statute is the
power of the legislature to voice disapproval by overturning any permission
of a court with an explicit prohibition. 282 Campaigns have been mounted in
recent years to ban second-parent adoptions, as well as homosexual
adoptions in general. 283 Most notably, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed a bill to ban second-parent adoptions in the District of Columbia in
1998.284 It has been asserted that the proposed amendments are not
"offered to promote the best interests of children, but rather to promote a
'2 85
particular political agenda.
A peripheral component of the conflict, where second-parent adoptions
operate without a specific statutory vehicle, is the issue of increased
litigation costs. California's treatment of gay "stranger" adoptions 286 can
be taken as an analogous situation, and has been noted as "quite instructive"
with respect to the financial concern related to adoption access. 287 In the
early 1990s gay adoptions "became almost routine," especially in the state's
more liberal counties, such as San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Alameda.
However, in 1995, then-Governor Pete Wilson overturned a Department of
Social Services policy that permitted adoptions without consideration of
sexuality. 288 Social service employees were forced to "automatically
reject[]" any bid from a homosexual to adopt any child. 2 89 This pushed
adoption hearings further from the discretion of social service employees,
requiring the prospective adopter to litigate their cases in the local court
279. See Lambda, supra note 277.
280. Id.
281. See Curry et al., supra note 13, at 3/4.
282. Id.
283. See Strasser, supra note 33, at 1047 ("[L]egislators may adopt measures in order to
disadvantage a disfavored group ... .
284. Id. at 1040.
285. Id.
286. A stranger adoption exists where the adoptee has no previous relationship with the
adopter before placement.
287. Curry et al., supra note 13, at 3/4.
288. Id.

289. Id.
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system, "mak[ing] the process more difficult and more expensive." 290
Similarly, where second-parent adoptions rely on litigation and judicial
interpretation in order to legitimate a relationship, they faced increased
29 1
transaction costs as compared with more routine traditional adoption.
While some state courts have found a place for second-parent adoptions
within their state statute, other states have refused to recognize secondparent adoptions without the severance of the biological parent's parental
rights. In addition, where only the courts of a state have recognized the
second-parent mechanism the potential remains for an abolition of this
adoption option through legislation. Finally, in the absence of a legislated
second-parent adoption process a potential second parent must seek
legitimation through the court system rather than through a less invasive
process. The next section will detail further implications of the denial of
the second-parent adoption method.
3. Consequences of Lack of Second-Parent Adoptions
Further evidence of the conflict between states that permit second-parent
adoptions and those that do not are those consequences which result where
second-parent adoptions are rejected by eligible couples (assuming the
option is available to them), or rejected through state proscription of the
second-parent mechanism. 292 Generally, the adoption structure utilizes an
"all-or-nothing" approach to apportioning parental rights, meaning that if a
parent is unsuccessful in retaining legal parental rights before a court, he or
she has no claim to the child. 293 Unlike custody disputes between "two
legally-recognized parents," who "begin the litigation on equal footing...
when lesbian mothers litigate custody, the legal mother begins with a nearly
insurmountable advantage over the non-legal mother." 2 94 In Alison D. v.
Virginia M., 295 Alison and Virginia shared a relationship for three years,
and cohabitated for more than two years, when they decided to have a child,
agreeing that Virginia would be artificially inseminated. 29 6 In July of 1981,
Virginia gave birth to a child who was given both last names of Virginia
and Alison.297 Both women acted as parents to the child, providing equal
parts economic and emotional support, and the child referred to both
290. Id.
291. See National Center for Lesbian Rights Web Site, Second Parent and Domestic
Partner Adoptions in California: What Lesbian and Gay Parents Need to Know in the Wake
of the Sharon S. Decision and AB 25, http://www.nclrights.org/releases/2ndparent-faq.htm
(last visited Oct. 12, 2005) ("In general, however, domestic partner adoptions cost less and
require less extensive investigation than do second-parent adoptions.").
292. See infra notes 293-315 and accompanying text.
293. See Young, supra note 63, at 522.
294. Shapiro, supra note 59, at 23; see also Nancy Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two
Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and
Other NontraditionalFamilies,78 Geo. L.J. 459, 471-72 (1990).

295. 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
296. Id. at 28.
297. Id.
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women as "mommy." 298 Nearly two and a half years subsequent to the
birth of their child, the women ended their relationship, and Alison moved
from their jointly owned home. 299 After some time, Virginia refused
Alison any access to the child, and Alison was forced to litigate for
30 0
visitation rights.
The court defined Alison as neither "the biological mother of the child
nor... a legal parent by virtue of an adoption," and rejected any finding of
parental rights on equitable grounds. 30 1 Alison was denied her bid to have
access to the child, despite her role in the child's conception, rearing, and
support spanning six years. 302 The dissent noted that the result of this
decision would weigh heavily on the children raised in same-sex
relationships, "limiting their opportunity to maintain bonds that may be
'303
crucial to their development.
In addition to a mutual suspension of a relationship, unexpected death
without legal recognition can lead to unfortunate results. In the case of
Nancy S. v. Michelle G.,304 Nancy S., the gestational mother, and Michelle
G., the nonbiological partner, had lived together for eleven years before
deciding to have a child.30 5 Nancy S. was twice inseminated, and gave
birth to two children: Kate, in 1980, and another, Micah, in 1984.306
Six months after Micah's birth, Nancy ended her relationship with
Michelle. After years of visitation, during which the children lived with
both parents, Nancy successfully petitioned the state court to declare
Michelle a nonparent. 30 7 Despite Michelle's pleas that the children were
"everything" to her, the state (at the time) did not award second-parent
adoptions, and Michelle had no legal leverage. 30 8 Several years after the
severance, Kate had convinced Nancy to let her live with Michelle. 309
Nancy soon moved to Oklahoma. 3 10 While living in Oklahoma with
Micah, Nancy was killed in a car accident, and Micah was without a
guardian. 3 11 "Oklahoma authorities refused to contact Michelle and instead
Micah was declared a ward of the state. '3 12 Days passed, and "repeated
pleas by Michelle and Nancy's relatives" were heard before the dispute was
298. Id.
299. Id. Alison also "agreed to continue to pay one half of the mortgage and major
household expenses." Id.
300. Id. at 28-29.
301. Id. at 29.
302. Id. at 30.
303. Id. (Kaye, J., dissenting). This reasoning is in line with social science studies that
find that the childhood relationships develop with the primary, daily caretakers, regardless of
biological relationship. See Bryant, supra note 19, at 238 n.37.
304. Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
305. Elaine Herscher, Family Circle, S.F. Chron., Aug. 29, 1999, at 1Z1.
306. Id.
307. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
308. See Herscher, supra note 305.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. See Overview, supra note 1.
312. Id.
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resolved and Micah was allowed to live with Michelle. 3 13 The lack of legal
recognition had led to days of uncertainty.
Finally, even the effects of September 11, 2001, may have been
compounded by lack of second-parent relationships, leaving children of
same-sex relationships without legal privilege to their nonlegal
parent's
3 14
inheritance, Social Security, retirement, or benefits coverage.
4. Adoption Rights and the Traditional Family
Given the derivative benefits of second-parent adoptions and conceivable
injury to both the nonlegal parent and child, it may seem curious to
supporters of second-parent adoption that opposition to second-parent
adoptions continues. However, in addition to the conflict between the legal
rationale of strict statutory constructionists and advocates of second-parent
adoptions, 3 15 there exist social arguments for and against same-sex
adoptions. Contentions for disallowing these same-sex adoptions have
materialized in a handful of arguments, including (i) the best interest of the
child, and (ii) the defense of the traditional family.
Statistically, the distribution of traditional families has gradually, and
consistently, declined since 1940.316 Census reports, documenting the
explosion of single parent homes from 1960 to 1990, may substantiate a
move away from the traditional family. 3 17 In fact, by 1988 approximately
fifty percent fewer American children lived in traditional families than did
in 1975.318 It has been suggested that the gap between the "rhetoric" about
the family and the "reality" of it is evidenced by the common failures of the
3 19
traditional family, including divorce, child abuse, and domestic violence.
However, since the focal point of any adoption procedure is the potential
effect on the child, 320 categorical appraisals of the effect of homosexuality
as a component of the adoptive family unit have been performed and
propounded. A loud voice in opposition to homosexual adoptions vis-A-vis
the best interest of the child has been Dr. Paul Cameron, who subscribes to
313. Id.
314. See Kate Kendall, Second-Class Victims of September 11th Attacks, National Center
for Lesbian Rights, http://nclrights.org/releases/septllbenefitsl01901.htm (last visited Oct.
18, 2005). Kendall notes that
[u]nlike legally married spouses ...surviving lesbian and gay spouses must not
only cope with the devastating emotional loss but must also figure out how to pay
the mortgage, cover burial expenses and put the kids through college with none of
the financial support and protection automatically given to legally recognized
spouses.
Id.
315. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
316. See Howard V. Hayghe, Family Members in the Work Force, Monthly Lab. Rev.,
Mar. 1990, at 14, 18-19.
317. See Martha L. A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family
Rhetoric, 81 Va. L. Rev 2181, 2188 nn. 13-17, 2189 nn. 18-19 (1995).
318. See Hayghe, supra note 316, at 17 & tbl. 3.
319. See Young, supra note 63, at 509-10.
320. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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the view that "children of gays or lesbians are social and psychological
misfits." '32 1 Conflicting with Dr. Cameron's views are those of the
American Psychological Association, which has supported the more widely
accepted view-that children of gay or lesbian parents are not
disadvantaged "in any significant respect" when compared to children of
heterosexual parents. 322 Much sociological evidence suggests that gay and
lesbian parents provide similarly satisfying atmospheres for "psychosocial
32 3
growth" as heterosexual parents.
A second social concern, apart from the integration of children of samesex couples, is the preservation of the value of the institution of the
traditional family, which has played a part in judicial definitions of parental
rights 324 and also in denying second-parent adoptions. 325 The traditional,
nuclear family, phrased as a "conjugal household consisting of a husband,
wife and their dependent children," 3 26 has been called upon as a source of
stability for American society. 327 If this traditional, nuclear family is seen
as the default family unit then unmarried parents may be characterized as
aberrational in judicial and social systems. 328 The same-sex aberrationbe seen as a
and the lack of stability and traditional value attached-can
32 9
problems.
social
societal
portion--of
a
least
at
source--of
Alternatively, the rationale of the traditional family has been criticized on
two grounds: (i) It overvalues the role the traditional family has played in
societal development, 330 and (ii) it devalues the merits embodied in the
33 1
nontraditional family.
321. See Hollinger, supra note 14, § 3.06[6], at 3-56 & n.75.
322. Charlotte J. Patterson, Am. Psychological Ass'n, Lesbian and Gay Parenting: A
Resource for Psycholgists § I.D (1995), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/parent.html.
323. Id. Charlotte Patterson's survey of studies includes analysis of, among other things,
the "development of gender identity among children of lesbian mothers"; "[s]ex role
behavior of children"; "rates of homosexuality among the offspring of lesbian or gay
parents"; and "potential differences between children of gay and lesbian versus heterosexual
parents ... [in the] children's social relationships." Id. § B.
324. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113-32 (1989) (upholding a restriction
on a biological father's parental liberty interest where the child's mother was married to
another man); In re D.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 35 (Ala. 2002); Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-1,
1988 WL 30173, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988).
325. See supra note 254 and accompanying text; see also 144 Cong. Rec. H19109 (daily
ed. Aug. 6, 1998) (statement of Rep. Largent) (stating the second-parent adoptions do not
"protect the right of each child to grow up in a permanent, stable, loving family").
326. Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthoodas an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 Va. L. Rev. 879,
879 & n.1 (1984).
327. For an argument, based in religion, and espousing the moral realism attached to
adoptions by homosexuals, see Lynne Marie Kohm, Moral Realism and the Adoption of
Children by Homosexuals, 38 New Eng. L. Rev 643, 653 (2004). "The most loving man
cannot teach a girl how to be a woman .... [Tiwo gay dads may not be enough to guide a
daughter through her first menstrual cycle. Little boys and little girls need the loving
influence of both a male and a female parent." Id.
328. See Young, supra note 63, at 533.
329. Id.
330. "Americans have... glamorized the nuclear family... '[flamilies have always been
in flux and often in crisis; they have never lived up to the nostalgic notion .... ' Lynn
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Nontraditional families have been touted as apt, or superior, replacements
for the traditional, nuclear family. 332 The limited nuclear view of family
excludes contributions made by individuals other than the biological mother
and father. 333 And some courts, as well as social and psychological
authorities, have recognized that the principle factor in the positive
development of the child is not the sexual identity of the parent, or
the element of continuity
adherence to a predefined family unit, but rather
334
of relationships in the childhood environment.
The prevailing social scientific support and limited state court approval
of second-parent adoptions stand in conflict with the several states which
retain express and tacit disapprovals of the mechanism. As noted, the
prohibition of second-parent adoptions may face a constitutional conflict
when second-parent adoptions are placed on a spectrum of constitutionally
protected family rights running from the constitutionally protected family
and control of the child to the unprotected traditional adoption.
B. Rights of the Biological-MaritalParentalUnit
Second-parent adoption involves the legitimation of a family-like unit,
and, in some instances, the protection of the family has been recognized as
one of the fundamental and basic tenets woven into the American
It has been argued that Supreme Court
constitutional fabric. 3 35
jurisprudence has displayed an ever-growing notion of what is a
"family. 33 6 Initially, the Court's early cases painted the constitutional
protection of the family as limited to the "nuclear family." 337 However, the
complete contemporary jurisprudence takes a more substantive view of
what is a constitutional family, expanding protection for more complex
"family forms," at the expense of state autonomy in the arena of family
law.

338

Eisaguirre, The Model Family that Never Was, Rocky Mtn. News (Denver), Mar. 12, 1995,
at 87A. "Social fragmentation and the myriad of configurations of modem families have
presented us with new problems and complexities that can not be solved by idealizing the
past." In re Adoption of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993) (citation
omitted).
331. See infra notes 337-39.
332. See infra notes 333-34.
333. See Young, supra note 63, at 510 ("That vision... exclud[es] many people who
could or do contribute in various ways to their upbringing. In a society in which fewer
children have two married heterosexual parents who can attend to their needs.., the
rationale underlying the paradigm of the exclusive family appears to be especially weak.");
supra note 114 and accompanying text.
334. See, e.g., In re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (placing weight on the

stability provided to a child); see also Bartlett, supra note 326, at 902.
335.
336.
337.
338.

See
See
See
See

supra Parts I.B.1-2.
Hopkins, supra note 70, at 452-54.
supra Part I.B1.
Hopkins, supra note 70, at 453-54.
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1. Parental Rights: Initial Cases
In his article, The Supreme Court's Family Law Doctrine Revisited, C.
Quince Hopkins states that the initial Supreme Court family cases, Meyer v.
Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, centered on the right of the parent
to control the life of the child. 339 In establishing a parental right related to
the choice of a child's curriculum, the Court in Meyer v. Nebraska found
that liberty protected by the Constitution encompassed a right to "establish
a home and bring up children." 340 The Pierce decision, which followed a
couple of years later, overturned a state mandate that children attend public
school rather than private or parochial school, and was built upon the Meyer
foundation of parental rights and right to control the child. 34 1 Thus the
Court has distinguished between parent-child relationships which are a
product of a caregiver relationship and those which are a product of the
state-"'[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.' 342 It has been stated
that Meyer and Pierce place the right to control and parent the biological
child within the purview of the biological parents, rather than under the
34 3
thumb of the state.
2. The Parental Unit from Beyond Marriage: A Move to Substantive
Examination
The Supreme Court's decision in Stanley v. Illinois344 pulled family law
jurisprudence away from the traditional, nuclear home. 34 5 In Stanley, an
unwed father challenged a state law that presumed him, as an unmarried
father, to be an unfit caretaker of his children. 346 The Court protected the
rights of the unmarried father, and overturned the state statute as improper
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because
the restriction affected unmarried fathers but not mothers or married
fathers.

347

This expansion of constitutional protection for family units that were
more complex than the traditional nuclear family was further clarified in the
cases of Quilloin v. Walcott348 and Caban v. Mohammed.349 Both Quilloin
and Caban involved challenges to statutes which implicated the severance
339. Id.; see also supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
340. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
341. See Welt, supra note 90, at 188.

342. Hopkins, supra note 70, at 455 (quoting Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925)).

343.
344.
345.
346.

Id.
405 U.S. 645 (1972).
See infra notes 346-56 and accompanying text.
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 647.

347. Id.

348. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
349. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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of an unmarried father's parental rights. 350 The Court struck the statute in
Caban, while leaving the statute challenged in Quilloin intact,
distinguishing Caban as a case where the father/petitioner had significant
interest and involvement in the child's life-a relationship ripe for
35 1
constitutional protection.
It has been argued that the dismissal of the formalistic family and the
finding of the unmarried father's parental rights in Stanley v. Illinois

"established a framework for analyzing parental rights based upon each
parent's actual involvement with the child, rather than solely on any
biological connection. '3 52 The Court can then be seen as building on this
framework, and tending towards a preference for a substantive, rather than
structural, evaluation of the family relationship in Quilloin and Caban. The
success and failure of the respective challenges to the similar state statutes
faced in Caban and Quilloin is tied to the level of involvement of the
petitioning father. 353 Because of the actual father-child relationship, Caban
was emblematic of "bonds as warm, enduring, and important as those
arising within a more formally organized family unit," and accordingly the
Court struck the statute. 354 However, in Quilloin, where the father's apathy
was inapposite to the traditional and protected family, the Court allowed the
father's rights to be restricted. 35 5 The Court, then, has moved from
identifying the rights of the traditional parent to control the child's
curriculum in Meyer and Pierce, to finding parental rights for the biological
and involved, but unmarried, parent, in Caban.
3. The Parental Unit from Beyond Biology
The shift away from the nuclear family is evidenced not only by the
married versus unmarried father context, but also by the Supreme Court's
dismissal of biology from the parental rights calculation. Legal scholars
have noted that "if there are identifiable benefits from a blood relationship,
they are certainly subsidiary to the benefits derived from the association
350. Id. at 383 n.1, 384; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 249 n.2, 251-52.
351. Caban, 441 U.S. at 389 n.7. Conversely, the biological father in Quilloin had a

minimal relationship with the child, had never lived with his child, and failed to petition for
legitimation for eleven years. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247-50.
352. See Welt, supra note 90, at 190.
353. Philip Welt states, "Caban v. Mohammed provide[s] strong protection for parental
interests once those interests are established .... Quilloin provides that those unwed fathers
who fail to develop a substantial relationship with their offspring cannot claim an absolute
constitutional protection for their parent-child interest." Id. at 199 (citation omitted).
354. Caban, 441 U.S. at 394; see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1971); supra
text accompanying notes 85-88.
355. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 253; see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (holding
that a biological father's parental rights, as protected by due process, were not violated for
failure to give him notice of a pending adoption where the father had not developed a
substantial relationship with his child). Lehr focuses on "the function (engaging in parentlike behavior), rather than the form (i.e., the mere 'biological link')" and "on actual kinshiprelated behavior of people, rather than formalistic structure." See Hopkins, supra note 70, at
458.
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between individuals." 356 In this vein, it has been argued that the Court took
both a step away, and towards, a structuralist family analysis in Michael H.
v. GeraldD. 357 In Michael H., a California state statute presumed paternity
when a child was born into an intact marriage. 35 8 When Michael H.
was
fathered a child with a woman who was married to another man and 35
9
denied visitation rights to his child, he challenged the state presumption.
While some evidence suggested that Michael H. had engaged in active
parenting, the Supreme Court relied on the historical disrespect for the
adulterous, but biological, father. 360 The Michael H. Court plurality
detached the right of parenting from biology, upholding the denial of
Michael H.'s parental rights in favor of the marital family. 36 1 The treatment
of biology in Michael H. can be given multiple readings. From one
perspective, the Court can be seen as privileging the marital relationship
over the biological relationship. 362 In the alternate, as an expansion of the
represent a loosening of the
constitutional family, "Michael H. might 363
biological leash for adult/child kinship ties."
The Supreme Court can be seen as moving from according constitutional
protection to the nuclear family towards a recognition of parental rights for
certain unmarried and nonbiological fathers. In a concurrent expansion of
familial rights, the Court has required broad definitions of the term "family"
in state zoning laws. The next part briefly examines the Court's treatment
of such a scenario.
4. A More Inclusive Parental Unit
The claim that the Supreme Court uses a substantive, contextual
constitutional read in the province of familial rights 364 is not unique to cases
related to parental rights-other cases touching upon the protection of the
"family" from state restriction employ a similar "function over form"
analysis. 365 A comparison of the Supreme Court decisions in Moore v. City
356. See Welt, supra note 90, at 207.
357. 491 U.S. 1101 (1989). "In one view, Michael H. might represent a... privilege[ing
of] a mere social parent ... over a biological... father. A different reading of that case [is]
that the Supreme Court was.., promoting the marriage relationship over a genetic parental
one." Hopkins, supra note 70, at 462; see also Welt, supra note 90, at 204, 207 ("The
Michael H. decision significantly diminishes, if not extinguishes, the argument that the
Constitution presumptively favors the biological parents in custody disputes.").
358. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 117-18.
359. Id. at 115.
360. Id. at 123-27.
361. Id. at 131-32.
362. See supra note 357.
363. Hopkins, supra note 70, at 462.
364. This read is made vis-A-vis the Caban-Quilloinline. See supra notes 278-81.
365. See Fineman, supra note 317, at 2203 ("We must begin to think of family policy in
terms of the functions we want the family to perform and to leave behind our obsession with

form."); Hopkins, supra note 70, at 469 ("This focus on the functions rather than forms of
families encompasses a more expansive notion of family, similar to that adopted in Moore v.
City of East Cleveland ....").
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of East Cleveland366 and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas367 may elicit
evidence of a similar substantive constitutional read. In Moore, a plurality
of the Court struck down a Cleveland zoning regulation which only allowed
members of a single family to live together. 368 The ordinance's restrictive
definition of "family" prevented the petitioner, a grandmother, from living
with her two grandsons. 369 In Belle Terre, a few years prior, the Court
upheld a New York zoning limitation which restricted certain living spaces
370
to "one-family dwellings."
While the Belle Terre housing regulation was similar to that in Moore37 1
because both pieces of legislation restricted the makeup of the home, the
Moore Court distinguished the statute challenged in Belle Terre as a valid
exercise of municipal power to restrict unrelated people from living
together. 372 The Court went through pains to distinguish its Belle Terre
holding from a hypothetical case in which a state regulates two unrelated
persons living together-implying that biology was not the critical focal
point.37 3 Therefore, in the alternative, it may be claimed that the Court, in
analyzing "unwed father" cases, as well as Moore and Belle Terre,
employed a substantive analysis that valued the function of the family. In
Moore, it was clear that the grandmother was playing the role of the
surrogate mother, and while the blood relationship of the cousins was
distant, the group had a functional family relationship. 374 In contrast, the
grouping in Belle Terre consisted of transient college students with little
functional resemblance to the traditional family protected from Meyer
through Stanley.375 It can be reasoned, after Moore and Belle Terre, that

the Court has utilized a substantive constitutional read even when
determining the propriety of state statutes offering a definition of "family."
The instances of the Court's willingness to define the constitutional
family has shown that, regardless of any preferable placement for
legislative authority over family law within the province of state regulation,
366. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
367. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
368. Moore, 431 U.S. at 506.
369. Id. at 496-97.
370. Id. at 498 (citing Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 1).
371. David J. Christiansen, Note, Zoning and the First Amendment Rights of Adult
Entertainment,22 Val. U. L. Rev. 695, 700 n.44 (1988) (noting that the ordinances in Belle
and Moore were similar).
372. Moore, 431 U.S. at 498-99.
373. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 8.
374. Yao Apasu-Gbotsu et al., Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the
Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 521, 579-80 (1986) (noting that in
Moore, "the relationship of a grandmother to her grandson is functionally similar to that of a
parent to his or her child").
375. See id. at 580 (finding the basis for the denial of fundamental status in Belle Terre to
lie in the fact that the "relationship at issue ... was devoid of child-rearing or potential childrearing"); Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 Yale
L.J. 757, 812 (1985) (noting that Belle Terre may not have met the constitutional standard
of family because the college students' relationship was "transient" as opposed to the
permanent relationship of the grandmother in Moore).
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constitutional guideposts exist in the form of due process family protections
which set the outer limits of state regulation. The next part will offer
another circumstance, second-parent adoption, where the Court may define
the limits of state regulation through a reliance on multiple constitutional
interests.
Ill. A CONSTITUTIONAL RESOLUTION
A. Protectionof the FunctionalFamily
Assigning second-parent adoption shelter in constitutional jurisprudence
is essentially a call for federal protection-and concomitantly is a claim that
federal intrusion into a traditional state domain is permitted under the
Constitution. 376 The most readily implicated substantive area in a secondparent challenge is that of the constitutional family, but the types of family
covered by the constitutional umbrella may or may not include the secondparent unit. In opposition to any protection for second-parent adoption, it
may be argued that Moore v. City of Cleveland377 and Belle Terre v.
to
Boraas,378 together stand for the broadest protection the Constitution has379
offer-protection for a non-nuclear but biological relationship.
v.
However, these two cases must be read in tandem with (i) the Smith380
Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER)
Court's claim that biology is insufficient for a determination of the
protected family, 38 1 and also (ii) the severance of biology from paternity in
Michael H. v. Gerald D. When the expanded constitutional family is
analyzed with these mandates, those "boundaries" denounced in Moore
(stating that boundaries of family should not be drawn at the "nuclear"
line3 82) may also characterize both the traditional "nuclear" and "biology"
boundaries as improper for family definition.
However, the question should not be framed as entirely formalistic,
looking only at previous constitutional boundaries. Instead, the question
should be substantive: Why is constitutional capital allocated to various
family forms? 383 In other words, what is it about family that the
Constitution seeks to protect? Is it those "bonds [just] as warm, enduring,
and important as those arising within a more formally organized family
unit?" 3 84 Yet, traditional, more formally organized units have become less
376. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
377. 431 U.S. at 494.
378. 416 U.S. at 1.
379. See supra notes 366-76 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 37-55 and accompanying text.
381. Drawing from Justice Stevens's Moore dissent, the Court stated that "biological
relationships are not [the] exclusive determination of the existence of a family." Smith v.
Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform (OFFER), 431 U.S. 816, 843 (1977).
382. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
383. See supra note 365.
384. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1971); see supra note 88 and accompanying
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pervasive. 385 Therefore, our notions of what can provide "bond [just] as
386
warm" have been pushed outward.
Consistent with this characterization of biology as an improper and
antiquated constitutional border is the substantive observation by the Smith
Court that marriage, which, in some instances receives a heightened
constitutional protection, is not the product of biology, but rather a
"bilateral loyalty." 3 87 Similarly, second-parent adoption evinces a loyalty
and stability for the child that exists in the absence of biology. 388 At
bottom, when determining a level of constitutional protection, the Supreme
Court has supported a flexible reading of "family," with substantive review
of the functional nature of relationships. 389 Specifically, the Court's
constitutional jurisprudence evinces an expanded acceptance of the
substantive notion of the constitutional family. 390 Juxtaposing the cases
within the category of the "unwed father"-Quilloin versus Caban and
Stanley-it is evident that the Supreme Court has increasingly valued the
39 1
function of the family over the traditional nuclear, and biological, form.
The Court has expanded its notions of the family, concurrent with societal
trends, 392 because the nontraditional family may exhibit "bonds... [just] as
warm, enduring, and important as those arising within a more formally
organized family unit."' 393 The Court has distinguished these "warm,
enduring" bonds from those of unwed fathers who have failed to be a
constant influence in their child's life.3 94 If analyzed with an approach that
champions function over form, prohibition of second-parent adoptions may
run afoul of constitutional considerations.
As in the paradigmatic case of the same-sex couple deciding to become
parents together, second-parent adoption exhibits a parent-child relationship
like that of a traditional family. 395 The triad evinces bonds similar to the
traditional family unit. As an example, in In re Adoptions of B.L.V.B. &
E.L.V.B., 396 after the partners decided to "have and raise [a child]," one
partner was artificially inseminated. 3 97 The nonbiological mother took on
the role of a non-gestational parent, and "assisted the mid-wife at both
births, and [was] equally responsible for raising and parenting the children"

385. See supranotes 316-20 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 88, 332-35 and accompanying text.
387. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform (OFFER), 431 U.S. 816,
844 (1977) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488 (1965)).
388. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
389. See Hopkins, supra note 70, at 471.
390. See supra notes 337-87 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 364-87 and accompanying text.

392.
393.
394.
text.
395.
396.
397.

See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
For a discussion of Quilloin and Caban, see supra notes 89-98 and accompanying
See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
Id. at 1272; see also supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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from their birth and throughout their childhood. 39 8 The nonbiological bond
in In re B.L.V.B. is substantially similar to the unwed father relationship
faced by the Court in Caban v. Mohammed, where the Court recognized a
fundamental parenting interest for a father who had lived with his child and
her mother for seven years. 399 It is a rapport more closely analogous to the
protected grandmother of Moore than the unprotected college students of
Belle Terre. The reason is not biology but function and "warm bonds."
B. A Protection Greaterthan Adoption
Just as the challenges raised in Moore4°° and Stanley40 1 sought to
preserve biological families, the recognition of second-parent adoption
preemptively preserves an existing family. However, because of the
necessary involvement of the state for the sanction of a parent-child
relationship, second-parent relationships are in some respects akin to
adoption. The primary case relied upon for the proposition that adoptions
do not40 fall within the arena of fundamental constitutional protection is
Smith. 2 In Smith, 40 3 the foster parent-foster child relationship was not
entitled to constitutional protection as a liberty interest in the context of the
foster parent's right to adopt. 40 4 The Smith Court's dismissal of the claim
relied, in large part, on the origin of the foster relationship: a contract with
the state. 40 5 Flowing from this contract was a limited expectation of the
permanency of the child-foster parent relationship. 40 6 Further, the Smith
Court noted that the adoption by the foster parent may be in conflict with
the long-term desires of the biological parent, who at some point may have
wanted the child returned from foster care.407
On the terms of Smith the second-parent adoption form does not ignite
the concerns of the Court. First, the relationship develops without state
involvement. For example, in the case of In re B.L.V.B., the raising of the
child by the same-sex couple took place for years before the couple sought
any legal declaration of the nonbiological parent. 40 8 As the In re B.L. V.B.
court noted, when the couple petitioned the state for legal recognition they
already had an "existing status" as coparents. 40 9 In fact, any denial of
second-parent adoption rights also evinces the state's limited involvement
in the function of the relationship because, unlike the denial of a traditional
398. In re Adoptions of B.L. V.B. & E.L V.B., 628 A.2d at 1272.
399. See supra notes 91, 93 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
402. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.

403. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform (OFFER), 431 U.S. 816
(1977).
404. Id. at 847.
405. Id. at 845-46; see also supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.

406. Smith, 431 U.S. at 846; see also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
407. Smith, 431 U.S. at 846; see also supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.

408. In re Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1272 (Vt. 1993).
409. Id.

2005]

TYING THE BRAID OF SECOND-PARENT ADOPTIONS

1471

adoption where the relationship will never be created, the triad, as a social,
if not legal entity, will remain intact.
Second, unlike the foster parent relationship in Smith, where the
relationship created under contract suggested an expectation that the child
would be removed from the home, 410 in the case of the second-parent
adoption the two-partner decision to "have and raise" a child is a
commitment of dual parental presence in the child's life.4 1 ' This presence
conveys an expectation that each parent will be as permanent an influence
as that of any set of biological parents.
Third, the concern of conflicting parental interests, witnessed both in
Smith and the severance provision of statutory framework of traditional
adoptions, 4 12 is inapplicable to second-parent adoptions. In Smith the Court
noted the "tension" between the natural parent and the potential adopter
given that New York State provided for the return of the child to the parent.
The Court stated as follows:
It is one thing to say that individuals may acquire a liberty interest against
arbitrary governmental interference in the family-like associations into
which they have freely entered, even in the absence of biological
connection or state-law recognition of the relationship. It is quite another
to say that one may acquire such an interest in the face of another's
constitutionally recognized liberty interest that derives from blood
relationship, state-law sanction, and basic human right .... 413
Similarly, in the statutory framework of traditional adoptions, the
severance of the biological parent's rights is largely to eliminate the
potential for tension between the adopter and the gestational figure. 4 14 The
rationale behind the derogation of these adoptive forms is largely
inapplicable to the second parent adoption format. In the case of secondparent adoption, the partners decide together to have and raise the child.
Thus the adoption by the second-parent is at the gestational partner's
4 15
behest, rather than in opposition to her wishes.
If it is recognized that the family can exist outside of biology where the
connection is supplemented by a functionality substantially similar to the
traditional family, then it can be posited that second-parent adoption should
be entitled to a heightened constitutional protection. The fruits of these
protections would manifest in a more uniform access to the right of a
partner to adopt the child of his or her partner.

410. See supra notes 38-55 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 38-55 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 38-55 and accompanying text.

413. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform (OFFER), 431 U.S. 816,
846 (1977).
414. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.

415. See, e.g., supra note 305 and accompanying text.
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C. The Hybrid Analysis as Applied to Second-ParentAdoptions
Second-parent adoptions necessarily involve an interest in addition to the
family liberty presence-that is, whatever constitutional weight is attached
to the unequal application of laws to homosexuals as compared with
heterosexuals. Although homosexuals have not been classified as a suspect
class protected by the Fourteenth Amendment (as in the case of race), the
melding of the interest attached to the homosexual class with some due
process interests may lead to a heightened protection. 4 16 Importantly,
Karlan notes the progression in the interplay between equal protection and
due process from Loving to Lawrence: In Loving the Court's decision may
have survived with constitutional integrity, under either the distinct
umbrellas provided by the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process
Clause, whereas in Lawrence both implicated interests required the other
4 17
interest as support, "undermin[ing] the traditional tiers of scrutiny."
"[T]he more closely one looks at the principal cases dealing with rights
surrounding... parenting [and] family.., the more one sees equal
protection and substantive due process as regularly interlocking and
powerfully complementary sources of protection." 4 18 Much the way the
Court has displayed an expansionist view towards treatment of the
definition of family, it has increasingly employed the emergent model of
due process-equal protection reliance.
The mechanism of, and right to, second-parent adoptions may be
susceptible to the interwoven analysis of due process and equal protection.
As stated in Parts II.A and III.B, given the vector of expansion vis-A-vis
the protection of the constitutional family, second-parent adoption is ripe
This claim of due process
for increased constitutional protection.
constitutional integrity is buttressed by the presence of an equal protection
constitutional interest-the equal application of law to both homosexual
and heterosexual classes. The restriction of both interests evinces a
compounded constitutional offensiveness. This duality was noted by
Professor Julie A. Nice in reference to M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,4 19 where the Court
"a fairly
combined the equal protection and due process
interests:
420
important right" and "a relatively targeted class."
While the homosexual class has not been held to be a classification
deserving of the strictest constitutional scrutiny, it is at least a "fairly
important" or "relatively targeted" class. In fact the equal protection
interest in the instance of second-parent adoptions is substantially similar to
42 1 where the
the equal protection interest discussed in Lawrence v. Texas,
4 22
Court acknowledged the equal protection claim as colorable.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.

See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
Tribe, supra note 122, at 1902 n.32.
519 U.S. 102 (1996).
Nice, supra note 189, at 1229.
See supra notes 204-28 and accompanying text.
See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
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As in Lawrence, where a criminal law banning sodomy was applied to
homosexuals but not to heterosexuals, in the case of second-parent
adoptions heterosexual stepparents have access to a form of adoption where
homosexual second parents do not.42 3 The certainty of access to adoption
mechanisms for a nonbiological-parent, heterosexual spouse who wishes to
adopt their partner's child is not widely available to a homosexual person
and his partner. Despite the lack of heightened protection for the
homosexual class, it is not completely without constitutional capital: As
Karlan notes, the coherence of the Lawrence decision required the weight of
the homosexual equal protection interests.
Further, the hybrid analysis is not consumed by the individual
constitutional weight of interests but rather the interplay between the dual
interests. In the case of second-parent adoptions, much like in Lawrence v.
Texas, the equal protection interest is present, along with a liberty interesthere the protection of an expanded constitutional family. The jurisprudence
from Meyer to Michael H. has evinced an ever-expanding notion of the
definition of the "constitutional family," analyzing the function of the
family rather than the form. In this sense, second-parent adoption functions
much like the family traditionally protected by the Constitution. Regardless
of the makeup of a same-sex parental unit, second-parent adoption should
be within the protected sphere of a relational unit because it provides
"warm, enduring" bonds.
CONCLUSION

Second-parent adoptions involve both traditional notions of family and
families headed by homosexual partners. This braiding of interests is not
unlike patterns tackled by the Court in Loving, Skinner, and most recently
Lawrence. The Court's constitutional blueprint has included recognition of
the dual presence of equal protection and due process interests, which has
partially preempted the states' control over family law. The functional
value of the second-parent model, supplemented by the dual homosexual
interests present a readiness for an increase in the constitutional weight of
second-parent adoptions.

423. See supra Part II.A.1.
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